Working Less and Bargain Hunting More: Macro Implications of Sales during Japan’s Lost Decade

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Abstract

We examine macroeconomic implications of sales. By focusing on the fact that bargain hunting is time consuming, we construct a DSGE model with sales and households’ endogenous bargain hunting. The model reveals that trend declines in hours worked during Japan’s lost decade account for actual rises in a sales frequency, rises in the fraction of bargain hunters, and a part of actual declines in inflation rates. The real effects of monetary policy weaken, because sales prices are frequently revised and endogenous bargain hunting enhances the strategic substitutability of sales.

Keywords: sales; monetary policy; lost decades; time use

JEL classification: E3, E5

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1 Introduction

Two remarkable observations during the Japan’s lost decades since 1990s are a change in firms’ price setting strategy together with a change in households’ working behaviors. Japanese firms increase the number of sales, temporary cuts of goods prices from regular prices, gradually but monotonically. Consequently, households purchase greater number of goods at the sale price rather than at the regular price. During the same period, hours worked per worker displays a secular decline partly reflecting the statutory reduction in hours worked, *jitai*, and possibly a demographic change, dampening output (Hayashi and Prescott (2002)).

In the current paper, we ask if sales conducted by firms play an important in the variations of output and inflation in the Japanese economy, in relation with the households’ time allocation decision between labor input, leisure, and searching for cheaper goods. To this end, we investigate the source and macroeconomic implications of sales by extending the work of Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011, hereafter GS). GS (2011) develop a DSGE model in which the economy consists of two classes of consumers, price-insensitive customers called “loyal customers” and price-sensitive customers called “bargain hunters.” While a proportion of the two classes of consumers is fixed, since firms cannot tell them apart, the firms’ best pricing strategy is then to hold periodic sales.

In contrast to GS (2011), the household in our model makes endogenous decision about the intensity by which it responds to a relative price differentials among items. Each household consists of an infinite number of shoppers, and it chooses a portion of shoppers acting as loyal customers and those acting as bargain hunters. With a sizable number of bargain hunters, the household can substitute away from a relatively expensive brand item. Because the searching activity for a lower price reduces the time available for labor input and leisure, however, the increases in bargain hunter comes at a cost to the household.

We reveal that macroeconomic implications are greatly modified when considering sales and endogenous bargain hunting. We report mainly two findings. First, Japan’s trend declines in hours worked account for actual trend rises in sales frequency during Japan’s lost decade, if the changes in hours worked are driven by technology or demand shocks. In addition, our model suggests a downward (upward) trend in the fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters). Trend declines in hours worked contribute, in part,
Second, the effect of an accommodative monetary policy shock on real economic activity is mitigated, when bargain hunting is endogenous. The shock increases hours worked, which, in turn, increases (decreases) the fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters). Firms lower their sales frequency. Since sales-priced goods are sold more than normal-priced goods in terms of quantity, those changes in households’ and firms’ actions yield a downward pressure on aggregate demand for goods. The real effects of monetary policy diminish. This result is also explained by intensified strategic substitutability of sales. Suppose that all firms but firm A raise their sales frequency. As in GS (2011), it loses an incentive for firm A to raise its sales frequency, because its decreases the marginal revenue from sales. In our model, additional channel emerges. When all firms but firm A raise their sales frequency, an aggregate price falls. That increases aggregate demand for goods, and in turn, aggregate demand for labor. Households supply more labor and lose time in bargain hunting. The fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters) increases (decreases). By observing this, firm A lowers its sales frequency. Such intensified strategic substitutability of sales mitigates the real effect of monetary policy.

The following two papers suggest that hours worked and bargain hunting closely interact. First, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) use scanner data and time diaries to examine households’ substitution between shopping and home production. They find that older households shop the most frequently and pay the lowest price. Second, Lach (2007) analyzes store-level price data following the unexpected arrival of a large number of immigrants from the former Soviet union to Israel. He finds that the immigrants have a higher price elasticity and a lower search cost for goods than the native population.\footnote{See also Pashigian and Bowen (1991), Sorensen (2000), Brown and Goolsbee (2002), McKenzie and Schargrodsky (2004), Pashigian, Peltzman, and Sun (2003).}

Regarding sales models, Varian (1980) shows firms’ randomizing pricing strategy in the presence of informed and uninformed consumers. Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) develop a DSGE model that incorporates not just menu cost associated with regular prices but also cost associated with deviations of sale prices from regular prices.\footnote{Although they are not the model of sales, Benabou (1988) and Watanabe (2008) construct a model incorporating consumer search and price setting.}

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides evidence for endogenous bargain hunting by looking at Japan’s micro price data. Section 3 develops a model. Section 4 presents the model’s impulse responses. Section 5 discusses Japan’s lost decade.
2 Evidence for Endogenous Bargain Hunting

In this section, we document various evidence to motivate and justify our modelling strategy regarding endogenous bargain hunting. First, from a goods-demand side, we look at Japan’s household survey on time use. We show the existence of time use heterogeneity in working and shopping across differing cohorts as well as its changes in the last two decades. Second, from a goods-supply side, we look at Japan’s Point-of-Sales (POS) data and present time-series paths of some economic variables associated with sales. We examine changes in the sales frequency. The fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters) is hardly observable. So we infer its movement by calibration based on the GS (2011) model or the calculation of a price elasticity.

2.1 Survey on time use

We begin by looking at Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities. The survey is conducted by the Statistical Bureau every five years. It asks around 200,000 people in 80,000 households about their daily patterns of time allocation. Questionnaire includes time use in working and shopping. In that respect, this survey helps us examine their relationship, which is the key to our model.

Tables 1 and 2 show summary results of households’ time use in shopping and working (including commuting time for work and school), respectively. The sample is that of over 15 year old. Numbers in the tables indicate minutes per week. Two results are worth highlighting. First, shopping time is longer for those who are not working than those who are working. We also find that female spends longer shopping time than male. Second, shopping time continued to increase from 1986 to 2006, in particular for male. At the same time, hours worked continued to decline, although they picked up slightly in 2006. Those results appear to provide a support for our assumption that bargain hunting depends negatively on hours worked.
Table 1: Time Use in Shopping (minutes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Both Working</th>
<th>Both Not working</th>
<th>Male Working</th>
<th>Male Not working</th>
<th>Female Working</th>
<th>Female Not working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Bureau, “Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities”

Table 2: Time Use in Working (including commuting time, minutes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Both Working</th>
<th>Both Not working</th>
<th>Male Working</th>
<th>Male Not working</th>
<th>Female Working</th>
<th>Female Not working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Bureau, “Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities”

Figure 1 demonstrates the life cycle patterns of time use as of 2006. We see a negative correlation between time in shopping and time in working, in particular, for male and people up to about 75 year old. For male, hours worked peak at around 45 year old, and at the age, time in shopping hits a bottom. After that age, hours worked decline and time in shopping rise. Over 80 year old, time in shopping begins to drop. This result is in line with Aguiar and Hurst (2007). When we point out that Japan’s rapid aging population has influenced bargain hunting as well as working, readers may wonder if bargain hunting is totally exogenous caused by the demographic reason. We do not deny this possibility, but using a model, we consider an endogenous relationship between bargain hunting and working.
Figure 1: Time Use in Shopping and Working for Each Age and Sex (minutes)

Source: Statistical Bureau, “Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities”

2.2 POS Data

Next, from a goods-supply side, we examine indicators of sales using POS data.

The POS data are compiled by Nikkei Digital Media. While existing literature often uses weekly or monthly data (e.g., Bils and Klenow [2004]), this POS data are daily. The sample period ranges from March 1, 1988 to December 1, 2007. The data are reported from various retail shops, including GMS and supermarkets throughout Japan. The products covered in the data are restricted to ones with a product code, known as the JAN code. The POS contains processed foods and domestic articles, but not perishables, services, or expensive durable goods.

For each item and each shop, amount sold and proceeds are reported daily. Each price is calculated as a unit price with proceeds being divided by amount sold. Proceeds

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3See Abe and Tonogi (2010) for the previous study using the POS data.
exclude consumption tax. The unit price may be decimal due to the consumption tax, time sale during a day, and several other reasons.\(^4\)

### 2.2.1 Sales frequency

Figure 2 demonstrate the aggregate, monthly time-series movements of three variables which are associated with sales and serve as key variables to the GS model.\(^5\) They are the ratio of a sales price markup to a normal price markup \(\mu\), the ratio of quantities sold at sales price to those at regular price \(\chi\), and the frequency of sales \(s\). Among them, this paper’s focus is on the sales frequency \(s\). Clearly, the sales frequency continues to rise during Japan’s lost decade.

![Figure 2: Key Sales Variables Implied from POS Data](image)

### 2.2.2 Fraction of loyal customers

We calibrate key deep parameters based on the GS model. In GS (2011), aforementioned three variables in Figure 3 serve as targets to calibrate three key deep parameters. Calibrated deep parameters are the elasticity of substitution between product types \(\epsilon\), the

\(^4\)The revised tax law was put into effect on April 1, 2004, requiring shops to display their retail prices including consumption tax. This revision causes discontinuity in the POS data on that period, although the tax rate was unchanged and the POS data continued to compile proceeds excluding tax.

\(^5\)For details, see Appendix A.
elasticity of substitution between brands for bargain hunters $\eta$, and the fraction of loyal customers $\lambda$.

We calibrate parameters monthly to investigate their changes. In doing so, we assume that the economy is at steady state at every period. Admittedly, this approach lacks justification. The following result is presented for the sake of illustration.

Figure 3 demonstrate the historical movements of the three calibrated parameters. We find that the fraction of loyal customers $\lambda$ is not constant, although GS (2011) assume its constancy. The fraction of loyal customers tends to decrease over the sample period, partly owing to the steady increase in the sales frequency. As for other parameters, we find that the two elasticity parameters increase. That reflects a relative increase in sales prices to normal prices, while a relative quantity sold at sales prices to normal prices remains almost constant.

Figure 3: Key Sales Parameters Calibrated by the GS Model

Looking at the fraction of loyal customers more closely, it is noticeable that it moves closely with labor market variables. In Figure 4, we plot the historical movements of labor market indicators on a left axis and the fraction of loyal customers $\lambda$ on a right axis. Two labor market indicators are (1) hours worked denoted by $h$ and (2) hours
worked times employment divided by the population over 15 denoted by $eh$.$^6$

The graph shows shrinking labor markets in the 1990s. Three forces are considered to be present. First, Japan was faced with the so-called lost decade after the burst of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s. That led to the prolonged recession. Second, the statutory *jitan* contributed to the fall in hours worked. *Jitan* was gradually introduced by the government thorough revisions of the Labor Standards Law: 1988:1Q to 1993:4Q and 1997:2Q to 1998:4Q, while the extent of jitan varied across industries and establishment sizes.$^7$ Third, demographic changes may have contributed to the declines in hours worked and employment, because Japan is one of the most rapidly growing aging countries.

Casual observations suggest a positive correlation between labor supply and the fraction of loyal customers. The trend declines in hours worked and employment are accompanied by the trend decrease in the fraction of loyal customers in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, the labor market recovered slightly. Coherently, the fraction of loyal customers picked up.

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$^6$Hours worked and employment are taken from Monthly Labour Survey in businesses with 30 or more employees. Hours worked represent those per capita. The data are seasonally adjusted and expressed as a logarithm deviation from their mean.

$^7$Before the revision, legal work hours were 48 per week. Legal work hours were gradually reduced to 40. Hours worked exceeding this legal limit should be compensated by at least a 25-percent premium. See Kawaguchi, Naito, and Yokoyama (2008) for the analyses on *jitan* and Kuroda (2010) for the counter-argument asserting that hours worked hardly declined with demographic changes controlled.
2.2.3 Price elasticity

The above discussion is logically inconsistent, however, because we used the GS model in which the fraction of loyal customers is assumed to be constant with the aim of examining the properties of the time-varying fraction of loyal customers. Without relying on a specific model like the GS model, we thus consider evidence for changes in bargain hunting. To this end, we look at how a price elasticity changes over time. Bargain hunters are considered to be more price sensitive than loyal customers. Therefore, if the fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters) decreases (increases), the price elasticity should rise.

Figure 5 plots the time-series movement of the price elasticity. That exhibits an upward trend in its absolute term, suggesting that households become more price sensitive. The price elasticity does not necessarily comove with the two labor market indicators, but their trends move in the same direction.
To sum up, those observations support the idea that households’ bargain hunting is endogenous, depending on their time spent in labor supply. As households are busy in work, they save time for bargain hunting, contributing to an increase (decrease) in the fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters).

3 Model

Bearing the endogenous fraction of loyal customers in mind, we construct a sales model. Our model owes its great deal to GS (2011).

3.1 Setup

**Household** We assume a cohort of households who has the following lifetime utility function:

\[ U(t) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j E_t \left[ v(C_{t+j}) - Z_{t+j}^h \left( H_{t+j} + \phi_L \frac{1 - L_{t+j}}{(1 - \lambda)^{\theta_L}} \right) \right], \tag{3.1} \]

where \( C_t \) is aggregate composite of differentiated consumption goods that is defined below, \( H_t \) is hours worked, and \( L_t \) is the share of shoppers that are chosen to be loyal customers in the cohort \( 0 < L_t < 1 \). \( Z_t^h \) represents a stochastic shock to utility weight of the labor supply, with its logarithm deviation denoted by \( \varepsilon_t^h \). The share of loyal customers \( L_t \) is endogenous, with its mean \( \beta \). Parameter \( \beta \) is the subjective discount factor \( 0 < \beta < 1 \), and \( \phi_L, \theta_L > 0 \) represent the elasticity of utility from being loyal customers. The function \( v(C_t) \) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in \( C_t \), and \( v(X_t) \) is strictly increasing and convex in \( X_t \). The overall aggregator of consumption is given by

\[ C \equiv \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \int_{\Lambda} \int_{B} c(\tau, b) \frac{\eta \theta}{\eta - \phi_L} \right) d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_L}}, \tag{3.2} \]

where \( c(\tau, b) \) is the household’s consumption of brand \( b \in B \) of product type \( \tau \in \Lambda \). GS (2011) give the example such that product types include beer and dessert and brand includes Corona beer and Ben & Jerry’s ice cream. As in assumed in GS (2011), we set \( \eta > \epsilon \), so that bargain hunters are more willing to substitute between different brands of a specific product type than households are to substitute between different product types.
We assume that the bargain hunters are agents that can freely substitute from a relatively expensive brand $b'$ within a type $\tau$ goods, and the loyal customers are agents that cannot make such substitutions. For the loyal customers, therefore, the relative price across $\tau$ matters but relative price across $b$ does not matter in determining expenditure decision.

Suppose that all of shoppers are bargain hunters, then the households’ demand toward a specific brand $b$ in type $\tau$ is given by

$$c(\tau, b) = \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{p_B(\tau)} \right)^{-\eta} \left( \frac{p_B(\tau)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^*$$

where $p(\tau, b)$ is the price of brand $b$ of product type $\tau$, $p_B(\tau)$ is an index of prices for all brands of product type $\tau$, and $P$ is the aggregate price level. $C^*$ is an aggregate consumption spending. By contrast, when all of shoppers are loyal customers, then the households’ demand is given by

$$c(\tau, b) = \left( \frac{p_B(\tau)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^*$$

Since a household consists of bargain hunters as well as loyal customers, we assume that the demand function for each good is given as follows.

$$c(\tau, b) = \begin{cases} 
\left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{p_B(\tau)} \right)^{-\eta} \left( \frac{p_B(\tau)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^* & \text{for } 1 - L \text{ population} \\
\left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^* & \text{for } L \text{ population}.
\end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.3)

The household’s budget constraint is given by

$$P_tC_t^n + E_t[Q_{t+1}A_{t+1}] = W_tH_t + D_t + A_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.4)

where $W_t$ is the wage, $D_t$ is dividends received from firms, $Q_t$ is the asset pricing kernel, and $A_t$ is the household’s portfolio of Arrow-Debereux securities.

The endogenous $L_t$ is the most important innovation made in this paper. In choosing the optimal $L_t$, the household confronts trade-off. On the one hand, an increase in $L_t$ raises one’s utility. As equation (3.1) shows, it increases time for leisure by decreasing the time for bargain hunting. On the other hand, the increase in $L_t$ decreases the benefit from bargain hunting. The household decreases one’s utility by selecting the suboptimal amount of demand as is specified by the bottom of the demand function.
This second effect is more formally illustrated by the relationship between utility-related consumption $C_t$ and spending-related consumption $C_t^*$.

Appendix shows that $C_t$ depends on not only $C_t^*$ but also the following consumption wedge $F_t$:

\[ C_t = F_t \cdot \left( \frac{P_{B,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t^*, \tag{3.5} \]

and that $F_t < 1$ and $dF_t/dL_t < 0$. As the household makes more bargain hunting, $L_t$ decreases and $F_t$ increases. Households enjoy higher utility from the same amount of consumption spending $C_t^*$. If the household makes bargain hunting for all goods, that is, $L_t = 0$, then we have $F_t = 1$.

Additionally, Calvo-type wage stickiness is introduced as in GS (2011). Households supply differentiated labor inputs to firms. Wages can be adjusted at a probability of $1 - \phi_w$.

**Firms** A good thing in our model is that firms’ behavior is depicted in the same way as GS (2011). Firms in our model face the same demand function given by equation (3.3) as those in GS (2011). It is thus optimal for firms to randomize their price across shopping moments from a distribution with two prices. Firms set a normal high price $P_{N,t}$ with the frequency of $1 - s$ and a low sale price $P_{S,t}$ with the frequency of $s$. The only difference from GS (2011) is that firms optimize their pricing decisions by observing changes in the share of loyal customers $L_t$.

As GS (2011) argue, the strategic substitutability of sales plays a crucial role in firms’ pricing. The more others have sales, the less an individual firm wants to have a sale. Suppose that other firms always have sales. If the individual firm stops a sale and sells its good at a normal price, its profit increases, because price-insensitive loyal customers tend to buy the good even at the normal price. As an opposite case, suppose that other firms have no sale. Because sales attract price-sensitive bargain hunters, the individual firm can increase its profit by having sales. Such strategic substitutability makes firms randomize their price.

Firms adjust their normal prices with Calvo-type price stickiness. In each period, firms have a probability of $1 - \phi_p$ to reset their normal prices. Sales prices can be

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\(^8\)The utility-related consumption $C$ also depends on the price ratio $P_B/P$, but that does not influence the household’s decision of $L$ because the household is a price taker. As in GS, the price index for bargain hunters is the same for all product types that is, $P_B = p_B(\tau)$. 

13
adjusted freely.

Wholesalers produce goods using a labor input which consists of hours worked and the labor supply shock. Production technology is subject to a AR(1) shock $\varepsilon_t^a$.

**Monetary authority** A monetary authority sets a nominal interest rate $i_t$ following the monetary policy rule of

$$i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) \phi_n \pi_t^N + \varepsilon_t^i,$$

(3.6)

where $\rho$ represents a policy inertia, $\phi_n$ represents the response to a normal price change $\pi_t^N$, and $\varepsilon_t^i$ represents a shock to monetary policy.

**Resource constraint** A resource constraint is given by

$$Y_t = C_t^r + Z_t^g,$$

(3.7)

where $Z_t^g$ is a government expenditure shock, with its logarithm deviation denoted by $\varepsilon_t^g$.

**Exogenous shocks** We consider four types of shocks. They are shocks to monetary policy, technology, government expenditure, and labor supply:

$$\varepsilon_t^i = \eta_t^i,$$

(3.8)

$$\varepsilon_t^a = \rho_a \varepsilon_{t-1}^a + \eta_t^a,$$

(3.9)

$$\varepsilon_t^g = \rho_g \varepsilon_{t-1}^g + \eta_t^g,$$

(3.10)

$$\varepsilon_t^h = \rho_h \varepsilon_{t-1}^h + \eta_t^h.$$

(3.11)

As for the monetary policy shock, we do not assume an inertia, because the monetary policy rule is persistent by construction.

### 3.2 Key equations

We provide key equations to the model in a log-linearized form.
Sales pricing It is optimal for a firm $j$ to adjust its sale price $p_{S,j,t}$ by one-for-one with a change in its nominal marginal cost $x_t + p_t$,

$$p_{S,j,t} = x_t + p_t,$$

where a real marginal cost is denoted by $x_t$. This is the same as GS (2011).

As the share of loyal customers $l_t$ increases, firms decrease the sales frequency $s_t$:

$$s_{S,t} = \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} x_t - \left( \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{A}{1 - \psi} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} \right) l_t.$$

(3.13)

In the equation above, a term with a underline represents a new term compared from GS (2011). Like GS (2011), an increase in the real marginal cost $x_t$ decreases the sales frequency. Because the sales price responds by one-for-one to the marginal cost, the sales price increases more than the normal price. That decreases relative demand for sales, thereby decreasing the sales frequency.

Fraction of loyal customers The fraction of loyal customers $l_t$ is described by

$$0 = \left( \theta_c^{-1} - 1 + \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{1 + \gamma} \right) y_t - \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} w_t$$

$$- \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^z - \left( \theta_h^{-1} - 1 \right) \varepsilon_t^h - \left( \theta_c^{-1} - 1 \right) \varepsilon_t^g$$

$$- \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} B + (\theta_L - 1) \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} + \theta_h^{-1} \phi_L \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \lambda) H} \right) l_t$$

$$+ (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \left\{ f_t - \epsilon \left( x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right) \right\}$$

$$+ \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} + \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} f_t.$$

(3.14)

Two things are worth noting. First, the fraction of loyal customers $l_t$ increases with hours worked $h_t$, which depends positively on aggregate demand $y_t$. As hours worked lengthen, the disutility from bargain hunting increases.

Second, the fraction of loyal customers $l_t$ increases with the consumption wedge $f_t$. An increase in the consumption wedge means an increase in utility from a given amount.

\(^9\text{See also equation (C.102)}\)
of consumption spending. As the wedge increases, the benefit from bargain hunting diminishes, raising the fraction of loyal customers. The consumption wedge increases with $p_{SN,t}$, which increases with the ratio of sales prices to normal prices: $\mu = P_{SL}/P_{NL}$ and decreases with the sales frequency $s_t$. In other words, as sales prices increase to converge to normal prices or sales become less frequent, prices become homogenous and the consumption wedge increases.

**Phillips curve with sales** The Phillips curve with sales is given by

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 - \psi} \left\{ \kappa x_t + \psi (\Delta x_t - \beta E_t \Delta x_{t+1}) + \kappa A l_t + A (\Delta l_t - \beta E_t \Delta l_{t+1}) \right\}. \quad (3.15)$$

Compared with the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve, the equation has two new terms. First, as in GS (2011), changes in the real marginal cost, $\Delta x_t$, influence the inflation rate $\pi_t$. This is because the overall price changes through flexible sales prices as well as persistent normal prices. Second, unlike GS (2011), the share of loyal customers $l_t$ influences the inflation rate. As the share of loyal customers increases, the overall price increases. That results from the shift of demand for normal goods on a household side and a decrease in sales frequency on a firm side.

The real marginal cost $x_t$ is described by

$$x_t = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} w_t + \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma \delta} \left( y_t - Bl_t \right). \quad (3.16)$$

As in the standard New-Keynesian model, the real marginal cost increases with both the real wage $w_t$ and aggregate demand $y_t$. Furthermore, it decreases with the fraction of loyal customers $l_t$. Its mechanism runs as follows. When the share of loyal customers increases, demand for goods sold at the normal price increases and demand for goods sold at the sales price decreases. Such a shift of demand is amplified by a decrease in firms’ sales frequency in response to the increase in the share of loyal customers. Since sales goods are generally sold more than normal goods in terms of quantity, total demand for the goods falls. That diminishes the supply of the goods, and in turn, the real marginal cost.

Moreover, the increase in the fraction of loyal customers functions to decrease the real wage for both labor demand and supply reasons, decreasing the real marginal cost.
further. The wage Phillips curve is given by

\[ \pi_{W,t} = \beta \pi_{W,t+1} + \frac{(1 - \phi_w)(1 - \beta \phi_w)}{\phi_w} \frac{1}{1 + \xi \theta_h^{-1}} \left[ \left( \theta_h^{-1} + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \right) y_t - \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) w_t \right. \\
- \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^a - (\theta_h^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_h - \theta_c^{-1} \varepsilon_t^a \\
- \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} B + \theta_h^{-1} \phi_L \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \lambda) H} \right) l_t \\
\left. + (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \left\{ f_t - \epsilon \left( x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda) l_t} \right) \right\} \right]. \quad (3.17) \\

On the labor demand side, for the same reason above, total demand for the goods falls, which decreases labor demand, and in turn, the real wage. On the labor supply side, the fraction of loyal customers increases (decreases) to offset an increase (decrease) in hours worked. Thus, for a given level of hours worked, the degree of real wage increases (decreases) declines.

4 Impulse Response Functions

We simulate impulse response functions (IRFs) of economic variables to four types of shock. The first shock is an accommodative shock to the monetary policy rule. The second shock is a positive shock to wholesalers’ production technology. The third shock is a government spending shock as a demand shock. The fourth shock is a labor supply shock.

4.1 Calibration

Most of the calibration of our model parameters is based on GS (2011). For monetary policy rule, we introduce an interest rate monetary policy rule, setting \( \rho = 0.8 \) and \( \phi_\pi = 1.5 \), while central bank in GS (2011) adopts money growth rate rule. In addition, we use parameters associated with sales so that they are consistent with Japan’s POS data. The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 below. As for the parameters associated with the fraction of loyal customers \( \phi_L \) and \( \theta_L \), we target a steady state level of the
fraction of loyal customers to calibrate $\phi_L$ given $\theta_L$.

Table 3a: Model Parameters

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
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<td>$\theta_h$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
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<td>$\phi_\pi$</td>
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Table 3b: Persistency of Exogenous Shocks

<table>
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<td>$\rho_a$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho_g$</td>
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<td>$\rho_h$</td>
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Table 3c: Parameters related to Sales

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<td>$\chi$</td>
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<td>$s$</td>
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<th>Parameters</th>
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<tr>
<td>(\lambda)</td>
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<td>(\phi_L)</td>
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### 4.2 Comparison between the standard New-Keynesian model and the GS model

To understand GS's results, we begin with presenting IRFs in the GS model, in comparison with those in the standard New-Keynesian model. By the GS model, we mean the model discussed above without endogenous developments in the fraction of loyal customers. The standard New-Keynesian model corresponds to the GS model without sales.

Figure 6 presents the IRFs of three economic variables: aggregate demand, inflation rates excluding sales (normal price changes), and nominal interest rates. The horizontal axis indicates time up to eight quarters after a shock. Top and bottom panels demonstrate IRFs to the accommodative monetary policy shock and the positive technology shock, respectively. Dashed and solid lines indicate IRFs in the GS model and in the standard New-Keynesian model, respectively.

The top left panel shows that, as GS (2011) argue, the real effect of monetary policy in the model with sales remains large, which is close to that in the model without sales. Similarly, the bottom left panel shows that the real effect of the technology shock hardly changes by the incorporation of sales. Whether a price index includes sales or not, inflation rates become more volatile in the model with sales than in the model without sales. In the model with sales, sales prices keep a constant markup on marginal cost by flexible adjustments. That makes the aggregate price index move more flexibly than the model without sales. Since normal prices are reset with the consideration of the aggregate price index, they become more volatile in the model with sales than in the model without sales. Nevertheless, as GS argue, real effects are similar between the two models, owing to sales being strategic substitutes.
4.3 Effects of endogenous bargain hunting

Now, we simulate IRFs in the model with endogenous developments in the fraction of loyal customers, in comparison with those in the GS model. We plot the IRFs of nine economic variables. In the figures below, dotted lines indicate IRFs in the GS model. Thick and thin solid lines both indicate IRFs in the model with endogenous developments in the fraction of loyal customers, with differing elasticity parameter values $\theta_L = 3$ and 100. A lower $\theta_L$ implies a higher elasticity of the fraction of loyal customers.

4.3.1 Monetary policy shock

Our simulation results reveal that sales can alter macroeconomic implications greatly. Figure 7 presents IRFs to the accommodative monetary policy shock. The effect of monetary policy on demand diminishes, in particular, when $\theta_L$ is as low as 3. The mechanism runs as follows. In response to the monetary policy shock associated with lowering the nominal interest rate, aggregate demand increases. That raises hours worked. Since households spend more time in works, their disutility from bargain hunting increases. With $\theta_L$ as low as 3, the fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters) increases (de-
increases) in a relatively elastic manner. In viewing this, firms lower their sales frequency. Since sales-priced goods are sold more than normal-priced goods in terms of quantity, the decrease in the sales frequency mitigates the increase in aggregate demand.

The attenuated real effect of monetary policy is also explained by intensified strategic substitutability of sales. Suppose that all firms but firm A raise their sales frequency. As in GS (2011), it loses an incentive for firm A to raise its sales frequency, because its decreases the marginal revenue from sales. In our model, additional channel emerges. When all firms but firm A raise their sales frequency, an aggregate price falls. That increases aggregate demand for goods, and in turn, aggregate demand for labor. Households supply more labor and lose time in bargain hunting. The fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters) increases (decreases). By observing this, firm A lowers its sales frequency. Such intensified strategic substitutability of sales mitigates the real effect of monetary policy.

Inflation rates excluding sales (normal price changes) also move very differently in this model, compared with the GS model. In response to the accommodative monetary policy shock, inflation rates excluding sales increase far less in the model than in the GS model. As we explained in the previous section, the increase in the fraction of loyal customers functions to decrease the real wage and the real marginal cost. Although the increase in hours worked yields an upward pressure on the real marginal cost, the effect of the increase in the fraction of loyal customers functions dominates, when $\theta_L$ as low as 3. In contrast, the model yields greater increases in inflation rates including sales than the GS model. This is because the aggregate price index increases with both the fraction of loyal customers and the sales frequency.

When $\theta_L$ is as high as 100, IRFs resemble to those in the GS model. The fraction of loyal customers moves rigidly. That makes the model similar to the GS model in which the fraction of loyal customers as in GS (2011) is kept constant.
4.3.2 Technology shock

When the positive technology shock hits the economy, our model yields greater effects on aggregate demand and inflation than the GS model. In this type of sticky price model, the positive technology shock tends to decrease hours worked. That decreases (increases) the fraction of loyal customers (bargain hunters). Firms react to the shock by increasing their sales frequency. Because sales-priced goods are sold by a large amount, the increase in aggregate demand is magnified. The aggregate price falls, owing to the decrease in the fraction of loyal customers and the increase in the sales frequency. In contrast, the normal price increases. That results from increases in real wage and the real marginal cost, due to the decrease in the fraction of loyal customers. Although the graph plots only up to eight quarters after the shock, inflation excluding sales stays negative in the medium term in all of the models.
Figure 8: IRFs to a Positive Technology Shock
4.3.3 Government expenditure shock

Economic responses to the positive government expenditure shock resemble to those to the accommodative monetary policy shock.

![Graphs showing various economic indicators in response to government expenditure shock.]

Figure 9: IRFs to a Positive Government Expenditure Shock

4.3.4 Labor supply shock

Finally, we simulate IRFs to a shock to labor supply. This shock is formulated, being motivated by Hayashi and Prescott (2002). In analyzing Japan’s lost decade and incorporating the effects of *jitani*, they introduce the following utility function:

$$\log C_t - \alpha \frac{H_t}{40} E_t,$$

where $H_t$ and $E_t$ represent workweek length (hours) and the fraction of household members who work. Both $H_t$ and $E_t$ contribute to production. For 1990 to 1992, they take $H_t$ as exogenous. In our model, as we showed in equation (3.1), we replace the exogenous $H_t/40$ for the labor supply shock $Z^h_t$ and the endogenous $E_t$ for labor supply $H_t$.
with \(v \left( H_t + \phi_L \frac{(1-L_t)^\phi L_t}{(1-L_t)^\phi L_t} \right)\). Both \(Z^h_t\) and \(H_t\) contribute to production. Note that, in our simulation, the elasticity of labor supply is 0.7, less than one. In Hayashi and Prescott (2002), it equals one.

Figure 10 demonstrates that, when a shock increases labor supply, labor input and the fraction of loyal customers move in the opposite direction, unlike when the above other types of shocks hit the economy. This is because the positive shock \(\varepsilon^h_t\) decreases \(h_t\), although total labor input \((h_t + \varepsilon^h_t)\) increases. The decrease in \(h_t\) functions to lower the fraction of loyal customers, while the positive labor supply shock itself functions to raise the disutility of bargain hunting and thereby the fraction of loyal customers. With the elasticity of labor supply below one, the former effect dominates the latter; the fraction of loyal customers decreases. Although we do not show here, the fraction of loyal customers increases (unchanges), when the elasticity of labor supply exceeds (equals) one.

Figure 10: IRFs to a Labor Supply Shock
5 What Happened during Japan’s Lost Decade

As we see in Figure 2, the sales frequency $s$ continues to rise during Japan’s lost decade. In the current section, based on our model, we argue that the working mechanism behind this observation may be attributed to the decline in hours worked. We then discuss the implications to the macroeconomy.

5.1 Explanation for methodology

In doing simulation, we start with boldly assuming that only the technology shock drives the economy. We obtain the time-series path of the technology shock that accounts for actual hours worked in Japan. Although we do not fully claim the validity of this assumption, we point out the following reasons. First, it is a natural step to regard the technology shock as a chief driving force of the economy, alongside the literature of RBC. In addition, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) argue that the slowdown of the TFP contributes to Japan’s lost decade. Second, when jitan shortened the workweek length, labor hoarding may have decreased. Resulting enhanced labor efficiency is regarded as a positive technology shock.

We fix sales parameters calibrated for Japan’s POS data and estimate the persistence of the technology shock only. Our sample ranges from 1981Q1 to 2008Q4. After obtaining the time-series path of the technology shock, we calculate the time-series paths of the sales frequency, the fraction of loyal customers, the inflation rate, and the sales markup. We use two models: the GS model and our model with endogenous developments in the fraction of loyal customers characterized by $\theta_L = 3$, which is chosen to fit data. For simplicity, we neglect the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, which constrained the effectiveness of monetary policy during Japan’s lost decade.

5.2 Simulation results

Figure 11 illustrates that our model explains the movement of the sales frequency very well. It plots the model-based and actual sales frequency. In terms of the direction of its trend and the size of its changes, the model-based sales frequency moves very closely to actual one. Both series show steady increases in the sales frequency in the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1980s, when the actual data are missing, our model suggests a stable sales
frequency. In comparison, the GS model predicts much attenuated changes in the sales frequency, which in the graph is almost flat.

![Sales frequency graph](image)

Figure 11: Model and Actual Sales Frequency

Our model demonstrates unobservable changes in the fraction of loyal customers. Figure 12 shows this. Our model predicts that the fraction of loyal customers stays almost constant in the 1980s. In Japan’s so-called lost decade, the 1990s and 2000s, it exhibits a downward trend. Put differently, the fraction of bargain hunters increases during that period. Obviously, in the GS model, it remains constant. To check whether the fraction of loyal customers actually decreased, we plot the time series of the price elasticity calculated from the POS data and the time use in shopping obtained from the survey data. Their scales are adjusted to compare three series in one graph. The price elasticity increased in its absolute term. That indirectly supports a decrease in loyal customers, because the price elasticity of loyal customers is considered to be lower than that of bargain hunters.
Next, we turn to inflation. Figure 13 shows simulation results with actual price changed measured by CPI and POS in an annual basis in percent. Using the technology shock obtained by the above method, we simulate the time-series path of inflation rate. The model-based inflation rate excludes sales, so that it corresponds to the official CPI. Our model predicts much attenuated fluctuations in inflation rates, compared with data. Our model has almost no advantage over the GS model. In terms of the trend, our model as well as the GS model generates the decline in the 1990s and 2000s, which is consistent with the data.

Figure 12: Model and Proxy Fraction of Loyal Customers
The difference between the aggregate price index and the normal price is demonstrated in Figure 14. The aggregate price index includes sales prices. The normal price index is the one which corresponds to CPI. The aggregate price index was mostly negative during the lost decade, which implies that CPI underestimates the deflation. The GS model yields an attenuated difference between the two price indexes. This is because the sales frequency hardly changes in the GS model. Those model-generated series do not match the actual series obtained from the POS, although they are not directly comparable because weights between sales and normal goods are different.
Figure 14: Model and Actual Inflation Rate Difference between Aggregated and Normal Price Indexes

Figure 15 shows the time-series path of the markup ratio of sales prices to normal prices. The performance of our model is as poor as the GS model.

Figure 15: Model and Actual Markup Ratio
In sum, those simulation results suggest that our model improves the GS model in explaining the extensive margin of sales (sales frequency) but not the intensive margin (sales markup).

5.3 Other explanations

Although we implemented simulation by assuming that the temporary technology shock drives the economy, this assumption is not necessarily guaranteed. Other types of shocks may be suitable to account for the actual decline in hours worked. Instead of transitory shocks, structural changes may have shifted hours worked in their steady state.

We check robustness of our results in three ways. First, we investigate cases where other shocks than the technology shock drive the decline in hours worked. Second, we investigate cases where hours worked changes in their steady state. Third, we investigate cases where an innovation in bargain hunting technology influences bargain hunting in steady state.

5.3.1 Other stochastic shocks

We consider two other types of shocks: a government expenditure shock and a labor supply shock. A government expenditure shock, in part, captures the idea that the statutory decline in hours worked is subsidized by fiscal policy, influencing governmental expenditure. The government expenditure shock is also categorized as a demand shock, opposed to the technology shock analyzed above. If Japan’s lost decade is understood as a situation where demand was insufficient, negative demand shocks become a candidate for the driving force of the Japanese economy. For example, Sugo and Ueda (2008) estimate a sticky-price DSGE model and find that an investment adjustment cost shock was a main driving force. Bayoumi (2001) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) emphasize a financial reason including a zombie lending as a cause of Japan’s lost decade. Although the financial shock is not directly linked to the demand shock, the former is considered to influence demand for investment on the firm side. A labor supply shock is motivated by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), as we explained in the previous section.

Figure 16 shows that, if we assume that the government expenditure shock drives the actual changes in hours worked, our model performs as good as or even better than the previous case with the technology shock. First, as for the sales frequency, the model fits
the best when $\theta_L$ is 10. It tracks the trend rise in the sales frequency as the previous case. Moreover, it explains its fall around 2005, as well. Second, the fraction of loyal customers is shown to decline over the 1990s and 2000s. Third, as for the inflation rate and the difference between the normal and aggregate price index, our model succeeds in yielding more volatile and closer movements to the actual one than the previous case.

On the other hand, if we assume the labor supply shock drives the actual changes in hours worked, our model predicts opposite movements. The sales frequency continues to fall, and the fraction of loyal customers and the inflation rate continue to rise. They are contrary to data and our aforementioned simulation results. Its reason is understood from Figure 16. In the model, $jitan$ is captured by a negative labor supply shock. To compensate the decrease in hours worked, labor supply $h_t$ increases endogenously. With the labor supply elasticity below one, the increase in $h_t$ is costly, preventing households’ bargain hunting. The fraction of loyal customers thus increases and the sales frequency decreases. As we noted in the previous section, if we assume the unit elasticity of labor supply, the shock has no effect on total labor input, the sales frequency, and the fraction of loyal customers.

![Sales frequency graph](image)

Figure 16: Model and Actual Sales Frequency 2
Figure 17: Model and Proxy Fraction of Loyal Customers 2

Figure 18: Model and Actual Inflation Rate
As a bottom line, our exercise suggests that both demand and supply shocks can...
account for the rise in the sales frequency, the fall in the fraction of loyal customers, and, in part, the fall in the inflation rate, by matching data for hours worked. The labor supply shock, however, yields completely opposite results.

5.3.2 Steady-state changes in hours worked

An alternative approach to accounting for changes in sales behavior is to assume that steady state has changed, instead of transitory shocks. To examine this possibility, we examine the effects of changes in steady-state hours worked on the sales frequency and the fraction of loyal customers. We fix parameters associated with sales, such as $\phi_L$, $\theta_L$, $\mu$, and $\chi$, assuming that steady-state hours worked change for other reasons. Other reasons include changes in technology, monetary policy, and the household’s preference outside the arguments in function $u()$.

Figure 21 shows that decreases in steady-state hours worked raise the sales frequency and lowers the fraction of loyal customers. In the figure, the horizontal axis represents changes in steady-state hours worked in logarithm. The scale of vertical axis is identical with that in the top panel of Figure 21. That suggests that about five to ten percent declines in hours worked account for the actual increase in Japan’s sales frequency. The bottom panel shows that the declines in hours worked lead to declines in the fraction of loyal customers.
Hence, similar to transitory shocks analyzed in the previous section, steady-state declines in hours worked also account for the rise in the sales frequency and the fall in the fraction of loyal customers.

5.3.3 Innovation in bargain hunting technology

Another explanation may be provided for the rise in the sales frequency, by relating it to an innovation in bargain hunting technology. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) argue that the internet lowers search cost for customers. In our model, $\phi_L$ in equation (3.1) serves as a candidate to capture bargain hunting technology, in that $\phi_L$ is interpreted as the degree of disutility from bargain hunting. We calculate how the steady state values of the sales frequency and the fraction of loyal customers respond to changes in $\phi_L$.\[^{10}\]

\[^{10}\text{In equation (3.1), we fix } \lambda \text{ in the denominator with its benchmark value.}\]
Figure 22 suggests that an innovation in bargain hunting technology leads to a rise in the sales frequency and a fall in the fraction of loyal customers. A decrease in $\phi_L$ mitigates disutility from bargain hunting. If we interpret this as an innovation in bargain hunting technology, then the innovation encourages more bargain hunting (a fall in $\lambda$). That increases $s$.

![Graph of Sales frequency $s$ vs. $\phi_L$ (log difference)](image1)

![Graph of Fraction of loyal customers $\lambda$ vs. $\phi_L$ (log difference)](image2)

Figure 22: Effects of a Change in Disutility from Bargain Hunting

This simulation result implies that not just a reduction in hours worked but also an innovation in bargain hunting technology, possibly brought by the internet technology, contributes to the actual rise in sales frequency during Japan's lost decade.
6 Concluding Remarks

We have examined macroeconomic implications of sales. To this end, we have constructed a DSGE model with sales and households’ endogenous bargain hunting. The model has revealed that trend declines in hours worked during Japan’s lost decade account for actual rises in a sales frequency, rises in the fraction of bargain hunters, and a part of actual declines in inflation rates. Because sales prices are frequently revised and endogenous bargain hunting enhances the strategic substitutability of sales, the real effects of monetary policy weaken.

Albeit indecisive, our analyses have suggested that the adverse demand shock was a main driving force during Japan’s lost decade. The shock succeeds in explaining not only rises in the sales frequency, but also declines in inflation rates and a difference between the price index excluding sales and the price index including sales. The shock is considered to reflect weak demand for fixed investment due to heavy debt burden on firms’ and banks’ sides.

Future research needs to securitize the sources of business cycles. Moreover, further qualitative and quantitative evidence for endogenous bargain hunting needs to be presented.
References


Appendix

A POS Data

This appendix explains how we define sales and normal (regular) prices and how we compute elasticity and aggregated price indexes from the POS data.

We define daily time by $t$; a monthly time bin by $t_2$; a sub category by $c$; an item (JAN Code as a unique product identifier) by $i$; a store by $s$, a sales indicator $r$ ($r = 0$ if sold at a normal price and $r = 1$ if sold at a sales price; a sales dummy by $I_{c,i,s}^t$; an official CPI weight in category $c$ by $\omega^t_c$; sales quantity for item $i$ in day $t$ by $q_{c,i,s}^t = q_{c,i,s,0}^t + q_{c,i,s,1}^t$; price for item $i$ sold at store $s$ on day $t$ by $p_{c,i,s}^t$; and expenditure for item $i$ on day $t$ by $\epsilon_{c,i}^t = \sum_s \sum_{r=0,1} q_{c,i,s,r}^t p_{c,i,s,r}^t$.

A.1 Normal (Regular) Price

Following Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), we define a normal price by the mode price in the window of about three months, that is, six weeks before and after each date. A good is judged as sales if its price differs from its normal price. That is, a normal price for item $i$ sold on day $t$ is defined by

$$\text{mode}_{t-42 \leq t \leq t+42}(p_{c,i,s}^t).$$

(A.1)

If multiple modes exist, we select the highest value as the mode price.

A.2 Elasticity

Price elasticity is defined by

$$\epsilon_{c,i,s}^t = \frac{\ln(q_{c,i,s}^t/q_{c,i,s}^{t-1})}{\ln(p_{c,i,s}^t/p_{c,i,s}^{t-1})}.$$ (A.2)

In this paper, $\epsilon$ is estimated using least-square regression.

We calculate the Spearman’s rank correlation $C_s$ between $\ln(q_{c,i,s}^t/q_{c,i,s}^{t-1})$ and $\ln(p_{c,i,s}^t/p_{c,i,s}^{t-1})$.

The null hypothesis is taken to be

$$H_0 : C_s = 0.$$ (A.3)
while the alternative hypothesis is taken to be

\[ H_1 : C_s \neq 0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.4)

The probability density of the test criterion \( \frac{C_s}{\sqrt{(1-C_s^2)/(n-2)}} \) under the null hypothesis obeys the t-distribution. We estimate the elasticity \( \epsilon \) if the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 significance level.

### A.3 Aggregation Procedures

#### A.3.1 Aggregation of the same item at different stores

The sales frequency is given by

\[
s^{c,i}_t = \frac{\sum_s q^{c,i,s}_t I^{c,i,s}_t}{\sum_s q^{c,i,s}_t}, \hspace{1cm} (A.5)
\]

where \( I^{c,i,s}_t \) is defined by

\[
I^{c,i,s}_t = \begin{cases} 
0 & p^{c,i,s}_t = p^{c,i,s}_t \\
1 & p^{c,i,s}_t \neq p^{c,i,s}_t .
\end{cases}
\]

The inflation rate is given by

\[
\pi^{c,i}_t = \frac{\sum_s q^{c,i,s}_t \ln(p^{c,i,s}_t / p^{c,i,s}_{t-1})}{\sum_s q^{c,i,s}_t}. \hspace{1cm} (A.6)
\]

The magnitude of price changes becomes

\[
\mu^{c,i}_t = \frac{\pi^{c,i}_t}{s^{c,i}_t}. \hspace{1cm} (A.7)
\]

Price elasticity is given by

\[
\epsilon^{c,i}_t = \frac{\sum_s q^{c,i,s}_t \cdot \epsilon^{c,i,s}_t}{\sum_s q^{c,i,s}_t}. \hspace{1cm} (A.8)
\]

The ratio of quantities sold at the sales price is monthly and given by

\[
\chi^{c,i}_{t_2} = \frac{\sum_s Q^{c,i,s}_{t_2} (Q^{c,i,s,1}_{t_2} / \sum_r Q^{c,i,s,r}_{t_2})}{\sum_s Q^{c,i,s}_{t_2}}. \hspace{1cm} (A.9)
\]
A.3.2 Aggregation of the same subcategory and different aggregated items

The sales frequency is given by

\[ s^c_t = \frac{\sum_i e^{c,i}_t s^c_i}{\sum_i e^{c,i}_t}. \]  (A.10)

Price elasticity is given by

\[ \epsilon^c_t = \frac{\sum_i e^{c,i}_t e^{c,i}_t}{\sum_i e^{c,i}_t}. \]  (A.11)

The ratio of quantities sold at the sales price is monthly and given by

\[ \chi^c_{t2} = \frac{\sum_i e^{c,i}_t \chi^c_{t2}}{\sum_i e^{c,i}_t}. \]  (A.12)

A.3.3 Aggregation of different subcategories

The sales frequency is given by

\[ s_t = \frac{\sum_c \omega_c s^c_t}{\sum_c \omega_c}. \]  (A.13)

Price elasticity is given by

\[ \epsilon_t = \frac{\sum_c \omega_c \epsilon^c_t}{\sum_c \omega_c}. \]  (A.14)

The ratio of quantities sold at the sales price is monthly and given by

\[ \chi_{t2} = \frac{\sum_c \omega_c \chi^c_{t2}}{\sum_c \omega_c}. \]  (A.15)

A.4 POS CPI

The POS CPI is defined by

\[ CPI_t = C_0 \exp\left(\sum_{s=0}^t \pi_s\right). \]  (A.16)

B Summary of the Model

Equation [A.9a] in GS becomes equation (C.83):

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_t &= \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{1-\psi} \left\{ \kappa x_t + \psi (\Delta x_t - \beta E_t \Delta x_{t+1}) + \kappa A l_t + A (\Delta l_t - \beta E_l \Delta l_{t+1}) \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]  (B.1)
Equation [A.9b] in GS becomes equation (C.97):

\[ \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} w_t + \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma \delta} (y_t - Bl_t). \]  

(B.2)

Equation [A.9c] in GS becomes equation (C.107):

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_{W,t} &= \beta \pi_{W,t+1} \\
&+ \frac{(1 - \phi_w)(1 - \beta \phi_w)}{\phi_w} \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon \theta_{h}^{-1}} \left[ \left( \theta_{c}^{-1} + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_{h}^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) y_t - \left( 1 + \delta \frac{\theta_{h}^{-1}}{1 + \gamma \delta} \right) w_t \right. \\
&- \frac{\theta_{h}^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^0 - (\theta_{h}^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_t^h - \theta_{c}^{-1} \varepsilon_t^0 \\
&- \left. \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} B + \theta_{h}^{-1} \theta_L \phi_L \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \lambda)H} \right) l_t \right]
\end{align*}
\]  

(B.3)

Equation [A.9d] in GS holds:

\[ \Delta w_t = \pi_{W,t} - \pi_t. \]  

(B.4)

Equation [A.9e] in GS becomes equation (C.101):

\[
\begin{align*}
y_t &= E_t y_{t+1} - \theta_c (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + \varepsilon_t^g - \varepsilon_{t+1}^g \\
&+ (1 - \theta_c) \left\{ \Delta f_{t+1} - \varepsilon_t \left( \Delta x_{t+1} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \varepsilon)(1 - \lambda)} \Delta l_{t+1} \right) \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]  

(B.5)

A monetary policy rule is described as

\[ i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) \phi_s \pi_t^N + \varepsilon_t^i. \]  

(B.6)
The fraction of loyal customers is given by

\[ 0 = \left( \theta_c^{-1} - 1 + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) y_t - \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} w_t \]

\[ - \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^a - (\theta_h^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_t^b - (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_t^g \]

\[ - \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} B + (\theta_L - 1) \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} + \theta_h^{-1} \phi_L \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \lambda)H} \right) l_t \]

\[ + (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \left\{ f_t - \epsilon \left( x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right) \right\} \]

\[ + \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} + \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} f_t. \]  

(B.7)

The consumption wedge is given by equations (C.99) and (C.100):

\[ f_t = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{P_{SN} p_{SN,t} - (1 - P_{SN}) l_t}{\lambda P_{SN} + (1 - \lambda)} \]  

(B.8)

where

\[ p_{SN,t} = \frac{(\mu^{1 - \eta} - 1) \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\} - \frac{\varepsilon}{\eta} (\mu^{1 - \eta} - 1) \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\}}{\left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\} \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\}} s s_t \]

\[ + \frac{\mu^{1 - \eta} \varepsilon^{1 - \eta}}{\eta} \frac{1}{\eta} \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\} - \frac{\varepsilon}{\eta} \mu^{1 - \eta} (1 - \eta) \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\} \]

\[ \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\} \left\{ s \mu^{1 - \eta} + (1 - s) \right\} s s_t. \]  

(B.9)

The sales price markup is given by equation (C.85):

\[ \mu_t = \frac{1}{1 - \psi} (x_t + A l_t) \]  

(B.10)

The frequency of sales is given by equation (C.91):

\[ s s_t = - \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} x_t \left( - \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{A}{1 - \psi} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda) \varphi_B} \right) l_t. \]  

(B.11)

Production input is given by equation (C.105):

\[ \varepsilon_t^h + h_t = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{y_t - \delta w_t - B l_t}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^a. \]  

(B.12)
As for the normal price index, equation (C.79) gives its Phillips curve:

\[
\pi_{N,t} = \beta E_t \pi_{N,t+1} + \kappa(x_t + p_t - p_{N,t}).
\]  

(B.13)

C Model Details

Households

Households maximize their utility

\[
u(t) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j E_t \left[ v(C_{t+j}) - Z_t \right],
\]

where

\[
C = \left[ \int_A \left( \int_B c(\tau, b)^{\frac{n-1}{n}} \, db \right)^{\frac{n(s-1)}{s(n-1)}} \, d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{s-1}}
\]  

(C.2)

and \(Z_t^h\) represents a stochastic shock to labor supply, with its logarithm deviation denoted by \(\varepsilon_t^h\). A demand function for each good is assumed to be the same as GS’s definition [7]:

\[
c(\tau, b) = \begin{cases} 
(p(\tau, b))^{-\eta} (p_B(\tau))^{-\epsilon} & \text{for } 1 - L \text{ population} \\
(p(\tau, b))^{-\eta} (p_B(\tau))^{-\epsilon} C^* & \text{for } L \text{ population}
\end{cases}
\]  

(C.3)

Substitution yields

\[
C = \left[ \int_A \left( \int_B c(\tau, b)^{\frac{n-1}{n}} \, db \right)^{\frac{n(s-1)}{s(n-1)}} \, d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{s-1}}
\]

\[
= \left[ \int_A \left( L \int_B \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{p_B(\tau)} \right)^{-\eta} \left( \frac{p_B(\tau)}{p} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^* \, db \right)^{\frac{n(s-1)}{s(n-1)}} \, d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{s-1}}
\]

\[
= \left[ \int_A \left( L \int_B \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{p_B(\tau)} \right)^{-\eta} \left( \frac{p_B(\tau)}{p} \right)^{1-\epsilon} db \right)^{\frac{n(s-1)}{s(n-1)}} \, d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{s-1}} C^*
\]  

(C.4)

The price index for bargain hunters, \(p_B(\tau)\), is given by

\[
p_B(\tau) = \left( \int_B p(\tau, b)^{1-\eta} db \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}.
\]  

(C.5)
As in equation [20] in GS, given the a fraction $s$ of all prices are at $P_S$ and the remaining $1 - s$ are at $P_N$, we obtain

$$P_B = p_B(\tau) = \left( sP_S^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}. \quad (C.6)$$

Note that the above holds true under the flexible price model and the Rotemberg-type sticky price model, in which the normal price $P_N$ is the same across goods $\tau$. Under the Calvo-type sticky price model, $P_N$ differs between goods $\tau$, so the above equation does not hold precisely. Its log-linearization form guarantees the validity up to the first order. Also as is shown in equation [E.6] in GS, $P_N$ needs to be defined as

$$P_{N,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j R_{N,t-j}, \quad (C.7)$$

where $R_{N,t-j}$ is a new normal price set at $t - j$.

Terms inside equation (C.4) are given by

$$\int_B \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{p_B(\tau)} \right)^{1-\eta} db = \frac{sP_S^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\eta}}{P_B^{1-\eta}} = 1, \quad (C.8)$$

$$\int_B \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{p_B(\tau)} \right)^{-\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} db = \frac{sP_S^{-\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + (1 - s)P_N^{-\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}}{P_B^{-\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}} = \frac{sP_S^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\eta}}{(sP_S^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\eta})^{\frac{\eta}{\eta}}}$$

$$= \frac{sP_S^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)}{sP_N^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)}^{\frac{\eta}{\eta}},$$

where the ratio of the sale-price markup to the nominal-price markup is defined as

$$\mu = \frac{P_S}{P_N}, \quad (C.10)$$
Equation (C.4) thus becomes

\[
C = \left( L \frac{s \mu^{v-\eta}}{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)} \right)^{\frac{(v-1)}{\eta (\eta-1)}} \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{1-\epsilon} C^*
\]

\[
= \left( L \frac{s \mu^{v-\eta}}{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}} \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^*
\]

\[
\equiv F \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^*.
\]

(C.11)

Here a consumption wedge \( F \) is defined as

\[
F = (LP_{SN} + (1 - L))^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}}, \quad (C.12)
\]

\[
P_{SN} = \frac{s \mu^{v-\eta}}{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)}, \quad (C.13)
\]

If \( \mu < 1, \epsilon > 1, \eta > 1, \text{ and } \epsilon/\eta < 1 \), which is often the case, we have

\[
P_{SN} < 1, \quad (C.14)
\]

because \( f(x) = x^{\epsilon/\eta} \) is a concave increasing function, and the denominator and numerator of \( P_{SN} \) are the weighted average of 1 and \( \mu^{1-\eta} (> 1) \). Therefore, the consumption wedge satisfies \( F < 1 \). That means that, because households do not optimally demand for goods, their utility from consumption decreases. The wedge increases as \( L \) decreases: the first differential \( dF/dL \) is given by

\[
\frac{dF}{dL} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} (LP_{SN} + (1 - L))^{\frac{-1}{\eta - 1}} (P_{SN} - 1)
\]

\[
= -\frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} (LP_{SN} + (1 - L))^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}} (1 - P_{SN})
\]

\[
< 0 \quad (C.15)
\]

If households make bargain hunting for all goods, that is, \( L = 0 \), then we have \( F = 1 \).

Households enjoy higher utility from consumption. However, it is accompanied with a decrease in utility by bargain hunting.
An aggregate price index $P$ satisfies

$$
PC^* = \int_A \int_B p(\tau, b)c(\tau, b)dbd\tau \\
= \int_A \left\{ L \int_B p(\tau, b) \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^* db \\
+ (1 - L) \int_B p(\tau, b) \left( \frac{p(\tau, b)}{P} \right)^{-\eta} \left( \frac{p_B(\tau)}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} C^* db \right\} d\tau. \tag{C.16}
$$

It yields

$$
P = \left[ \int_A \left( L \int_B p(\tau, b)^{1-\epsilon} db + (1 - L) P_B^{1-\eta} P_{\beta}^{1-\epsilon} \right) d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
= \left[ \int_A \left( L \int_B p(\tau, b)^{1-\epsilon} db + (1 - L) P_B^{1-\eta} P_{\beta}^{1-\epsilon} \right) d\tau \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
= \left[ L \{ sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\epsilon} \} + (1 - L) P_B^{1-\epsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}. \tag{C.17}
$$

Thus, in equation (C.11), we have

$$
\left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} = \left( L \{ sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\epsilon} \} + (1 - L) P_B^{1-\epsilon} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
= \left( L \{ sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\epsilon} \} + (1 - L) P_B^{1-\epsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
= \left( L \frac{sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\epsilon}}{(sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s)P_N^{1-\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} + (1 - L) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\
= \left( L \frac{sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s)}{(sP_s^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - s))^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}} + (1 - L) \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\eta}}. \tag{C.18}
$$

That is larger than one and decreases as $L$ decreases. As the share of bargain hunting $(1 - L)$ increases, the weight of bargain price index $P_B$ increases, and the aggregate price index $P$ decreases. Thus, the relative bargain price to the aggregate price increases, which decreases demand for bargain goods and increases demand for normal goods. Because bargain goods are sold more than normal goods, total demand decreases.
Households’ budget constraint is

\[ P_tC_t + E_t[Q_{t+1}|t]A_{t+1} = W_tH_t + D_t + A_t. \]  

(C.19)

Each household optimizes ones behavior given \( P_B/P \). The first-order conditions are written as follows: with respect to \( C \),

\[
\beta E_t \left[ \frac{v_C(C_{t+1})}{v_C(C_t)} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \frac{F_{t+1}}{F_t} \left( \frac{P_{B,t+1}/P_{B,t}}{P_{t+1}/P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \right] = E_t[Q_{t+1}|t] = \frac{1}{1 + \iota_t}; \tag{C.20}
\]

with respect to \( H \),

\[
\frac{Z^h v_H \left( H_t + \phi_L \frac{(1-L_i)\phi_L}{(1-\lambda)^\phi_L} \right)}{v_C(C_t)} = \frac{W_t}{P_t} \frac{F_t}{F_{t+1}} \left( \frac{P_{B,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon}; \tag{C.21}
\]

and with respect to \( L \),

\[
\theta_L \phi_L \frac{(1-L_i)^{\phi_L-1} Z^h v_H \left( H_t + \phi_L \frac{(1-L_i)\phi_L}{(1-\lambda)^\phi_L} \right)}{(1-\lambda)^{\phi_L}} = -\frac{C_t}{F_t} \frac{dF_t}{dL_t}. \tag{C.22}
\]

The last equation is rearranged as

\[
\frac{\theta_L \phi_L}{(1-\lambda)^{\phi_L}} \frac{(1-L_i)^{\phi_L-1} Z^h v_H \left( H_t + \phi_L \frac{(1-L_i)\phi_L}{(1-\lambda)^\phi_L} \right)}{v_C(C_t)} = \frac{C_t}{F_t} \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \left( L_t P_{SN,t} + (1 - L_t) \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta - 1}} (1 - P_{SN,t})
\]

\[
= \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{C_t}{F_t} \frac{1 - P_{SN,t}}{L_t P_{SN,t} + (1 - L_t)}. \tag{C.23}
\]

**Resource constraint**  A resource constraint is given by

\[
Y_t = C^*_t + Z^\theta_t = \frac{C_t}{F_t \cdot \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{-\varepsilon}}, \tag{C.24}
\]

(C.25)
where $Z_t^g$ is a government expenditure shock, with its logarithm deviation denoted by $\varepsilon_t^g$. It is log-linearized as

$$ c_t = y_t - \varepsilon_t^g + f_t - \epsilon (p_{B,t} - p_t). $$

(C.26)

**Monetary policy**  
A monetary policy rule is described as

$$ i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) \phi_x \pi_t^N + e_i^t, $$

where the inflation rate for normal prices is defined by $\pi_{N,t} \equiv p_{N,t} - p_{N,t-1}$ and $e_i^t$ indicates a monetary policy shock.

**Firms (Proof of Theorem 3 in GS)**  
Firms’ problem is almost the same as that in GS, because firms face the same demand function (C.3). The share of loyal customers $L$ is endogenous, but each firm take the $L$ given, so this fact does not change firms’ optimization problem.

Regarding the demand function at the sale and normal prices, equation [22] in GS becomes

$$ Q_S = (L + (1 - L)v_S)(P_S/P)^{-\epsilon}Y $$

(C.28)

$$ Q_N = (L + (1 - L)v_N)(P_N/P)^{-\epsilon}Y, $$

(C.29)

where $v$ is the purchase multiplier defined in equation [10] in GS:

$$ v(p; P_B) = (p/P_B)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)}. $$

(C.30)

This is defined as the ratio of the amounts sold at the same price to a given measure of bargain hunters relative to the same measure of loyal customers. By log-linearizing the above demand functions, equations [E.1a] and [E.1b] in GS become

$$ q_{S;j,t} = \frac{\lambda(1 - v_S)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} l_t + \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} v_{S;j,t} - \epsilon (p_{S;j,t} - p_t) + y_t, $$

(C.31)

$$ q_{N;j,t} = \frac{\lambda(1 - v_N)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} l_t + \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} v_{N;j,t} - \epsilon (r_{N;j,t} - p_t) + y_t, $$

(C.32)

where $r_{N;j,t}$ is a normal price set $j$ periods ago. Regarding the purchase multiplier $v$,
equations [E.2] in GS are the same:

\[
\begin{align*}
v_{S,j,t} &= - (\eta - \epsilon)(p_{S,j,t} - p_{B,t}), \\
v_{N,j,t} &= - (\eta - \epsilon)(r_{N,t-j} - p_{B,t}).
\end{align*}
\]  
(C.33)

Above four equations yield equivalent equations to [E.3a] and [E.3b] in GS:

\[
\begin{align*}
q_{S,j,t} &= \frac{\lambda(1 - v_s)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} l_t - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} (\eta - \epsilon)(p_{S,j,t} - p_{B,t}) - \epsilon(p_{S,j,t} - p_t) + y_t \\
&= \frac{\lambda(1 - v_s)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} l_t - \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} p_{S,j,t} + (\eta - \epsilon) \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} p_{B,t} + \epsilon p_t + y_t, \\
q_{N,j,t} &= \frac{\lambda(1 - v_n)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} l_t - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} (\eta - \epsilon)(r_{N,t-j} - p_{B,t}) - \epsilon(r_{N,t-j} - p_t) + y_t \\
&= \frac{\lambda(1 - v_n)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} l_t - \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} r_{N,t-j} + (\eta - \epsilon) \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} p_{B,t} + \epsilon p_t + y_t.
\end{align*}
\]  
(C.34)

(C.35)

The optimal price markup is given by equation [17] in GS. Rewrite this as

\[
\{L(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - L)(\eta - 1)v(p; P_B)\} \mu(p; P_B) = L \epsilon + (1 - L)\eta v(p; P_B). 
\]  
(C.36)

Log-linearization yields

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\lambda(\epsilon - 1)l_t - \lambda(\eta - 1)vl_t + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)vvl_t}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v} + \mu_t &= \frac{\lambda l_t - \lambda \eta v l_t + (1 - \lambda)\eta v v l_t}{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v}.
\end{align*}
\]
\[\mu_t = \frac{\lambda \epsilon l_t - \lambda \eta v l_t + (1 - \lambda) \eta v v_t}{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v} - \frac{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) l_t - \lambda (\eta - 1) v l_t + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v v_t}{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v} \]
\[
= \frac{\{\lambda \epsilon l_t - \lambda \eta v l_t + (1 - \lambda) \eta v v_t\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}} \lambda l_t \\
+ \frac{\{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) l_t - \lambda (\eta - 1) v l_t + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v v_t\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}} (1 - \lambda) v v_t \\
= \frac{\{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\} \lambda l_t}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}} v_t \\
+ \frac{\{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) \eta \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) v \lambda (\eta - \epsilon) \}}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}} \lambda l_t \\
+ \frac{\{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) \eta v \lambda (\eta - \epsilon) \}}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}} l_t \\
- \frac{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v\}} v_t. \quad (C.37)\]

We define
\[ q_S = \frac{\lambda (1 - \lambda)(\eta - \epsilon) v_S}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v_S\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v_S\}} \quad (C.38) \]
\[ q_N = \frac{\lambda (1 - \lambda)(\eta - \epsilon) v_N}{\{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda) \eta v_N\} \{\lambda (\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda) (\eta - 1) v_N\}}. \quad (C.39) \]

and equations [E.4a] and [E.4b] are transformed into
\[ \mu_{S,j,t} = -q_S v_{S,j,t} + \frac{1}{1 - \lambda} q_S l_t, \quad (C.40) \]
\[ \mu_{N,j,t} = -q_N v_{N,j,t} + \frac{1}{1 - \lambda} q_N l_t. \quad (C.41) \]

Overall demand,
\[ Q_{j,t} = s_{j,t} Q_{S,j,t} + (1 - s_{j,t}) Q_{N,j,t}, \]
is log-linearized as

\[ Qq_{j,t} = sQ_S(s_{j,t} + q_{S,j,t}) - sQ_Ns_{j,t} + (1 - s)Q_Nq_{N,j,t}. \]

Using \( \chi = Q_S/Q_N \), we obtain equation [E.5] in GS:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\chi + 1 - s)q_{j,t} &= s\chi(s_{j,t} + q_{S,j,t}) - ss_{j,t} + (1 - s)q_{N,j,t}, \\
q_{j,t} &= \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} ss_{j,t} + \frac{s\chi}{s\chi + 1 - s} q_{S,j,t} + \frac{1 - s}{s\chi + 1 - s} q_{N,j,t}. \\
\end{align*}
\]  

(C.42)

Note we define \( s_{j,t} \) as the log deviation, while GS define it as the deviation from steady state.

Define the weighted average of variables as in equations [E.6] and [E.7] in GS:

\[
s_t \equiv (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j s_{j,t},
\]

\[
p_{N,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j p_{N,t-j}, \quad q_{N,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j q_{N,j,t},
\]

\[
v_{N,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j v_{N,j,t}, \quad (C.43)
\]

\[
p_{S,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j p_{S,j,t}, \quad q_{S,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j q_{S,j,t},
\]

\[
v_{S,t} = (1 - \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_p^j v_{S,j,t}. \quad (C.44)
\]

The bargain hunters’ price index \( P_{B,t} \) is log-linearized as in equation [E.8] in GS:

\[
p_{B,t} = \theta_B p_{S,t} + (1 - \theta_B)p_{N,t} - \varphi_B ss_{t}, \quad (C.45)
\]

where

\[
\theta_B = \frac{s}{s + (1 - s)\mu^{-1}}, \\
\varphi_B = \frac{1}{\eta - 1 s + (1 - s)\mu^{-1}}. \quad (C.46)
\]

The price index for a hypothetical loyal customer \( P_{L,t} \) is log-linearized as in equation
[E.10] in GS:

\[ p_{L,t} = \theta_L p_{S,t} + (1 - \theta_L) p_{N,t} - \varphi_L s_{s,t}, \]  

(C.47)

where

\[ \theta_L = \frac{s}{s + (1 - s)\mu^{-1}}, \]
\[ \varphi_L = \frac{1}{\eta - 1 s + (1 - s)\mu^{-1}}. \]  

(C.48)

The aggregate price level given by equation (C.17) is transformed into

\[ P = \left[ LP^1_{L} + (1 - L) P^1_{B} \right] \frac{1}{1 - \epsilon}. \]  

(C.49)

In steady state, using \( \bar{h} = P_B / P_L \), we have

\[ 1 = \lambda \left( \frac{P_L}{P} \right)^{1 - \epsilon} + (1 - \lambda) \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{1 - \epsilon}, \]
\[ = \lambda \left( \frac{P_L}{P} \right)^{1 - \epsilon} + (1 - \lambda) \left( \frac{\bar{h} P_L}{P} \right)^{1 - \epsilon}. \]

(C.50)

\[ \left( \frac{P_L}{P} \right)^{1 - \epsilon} = \frac{1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \bar{h}^{1 - \epsilon}}, \]  

(C.51)

\[ \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{1 - \epsilon} = \frac{\bar{h}^{1 - \epsilon}}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \bar{h}^{1 - \epsilon}}. \]

The aggregate price level is log-linearized as

\[ (1 - \epsilon) P^{1 - \epsilon} p_t = \lambda (1 - \epsilon) P^{1 - \epsilon} p_{L,t} + (1 - \lambda) (1 - \epsilon) P^{1 - \epsilon} p_{B,t} \]
\[ + \lambda P^{1 - \epsilon} l_t - \lambda P^{1 - \epsilon} l_t. \]
\[ p_t = \lambda \left( \frac{P_L}{P} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} p_{L,t} + (1 - \lambda) \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} p_{B,t} \]
\[ + \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \varepsilon)} \left\{ \left( \frac{P_L}{P} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} - \left( \frac{P_B}{P} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} \right\} l_t \]
\[ = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\overline{h}^{1-\varepsilon}} p_{L,t} + \frac{(1 - \lambda)\overline{h}^{1-\varepsilon} p_{B,t}}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\overline{h}^{1-\varepsilon}} \]
\[ + \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \varepsilon) } \frac{1 - \overline{h}^{1-\varepsilon}}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\overline{h}^{1-\varepsilon}} l_t \]
\[ = \frac{\lambda\overline{h}^{-1}}{\lambda\overline{h}^{-1} + (1 - \lambda)} p_{L,t} + \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda\overline{h}^{-1} + (1 - \lambda)} p_{B,t} \]
\[ + \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \varepsilon) } \frac{\overline{h}^{-1} - 1}{\lambda\overline{h}^{-1} + (1 - \lambda)} l_t. \]

Equation [E.11] in GS thus becomes

\[ p_t = (1 - \overline{\omega}) p_{L,t} + \overline{\omega} p_{B,t} - \lambda \left( \frac{\overline{h}^{-1} - 1 - \overline{\omega}}{\varepsilon - 1} \right) l_t, \tag{C.52} \]

where

\[ \overline{\omega} \equiv \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda\overline{h}^{-1} + (1 - \lambda)}, \]
\[ \overline{h} \equiv \frac{(s + (1 - s)\mu^{\overline{\omega} - 1})^{\overline{\omega} - 1}}{(s + (1 - s)\mu^{\overline{\omega} - 1})^{\overline{\omega} - 1}}. \tag{C.53} \]
Equation [E.12] in GS becomes

$$p_t = (1 - \varpi)p_{L,t} + \varpi p_{B,t} - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \varpi}{\lambda} \right) l_t$$

$$= (1 - \varpi)(\theta_{LPS,t} + (1 - \theta_L)p_{N,t} - \varphi_{LSs,t})$$

$$+ \varpi(\theta_{BPS,t} + (1 - \theta_B)p_{N,t} - \varphi_{BSS_t})$$

$$- \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \varpi}{\lambda} \right) l_t$$

$$= \{(1 - \varpi)\theta_L + \varpi \theta_B\} p_{S,t}$$

$$+ \{(1 - \varpi)(1 - \theta_L) + \varpi(1 - \theta_B)\} p_{N,t}$$

$$- \{(1 - \varpi)\varphi_L + \varpi \varphi_B\} ss_t$$

$$- \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \varpi}{\lambda} \right) l_t,$$

$$p_t = \theta_P p_{S,t} + (1 - \theta_P)p_{N,t} - \varphi_{PSS_t}$$

$$- \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \varpi}{\lambda} \right) l_t, \quad (C.54)$$

where

$$\theta_P \equiv (1 - \varpi)\theta_L + \varpi \theta_B$$

$$\varphi_P \equiv (1 - \varpi)\varphi_L + \varpi \varphi_B. \quad (C.55)$$

Regarding production, we have

$$Q_{j,t} = Z^a_t \left( Z^h_i H_{j,t} \right)^\alpha,$$  \quad (C.56)

where $Z^a_t$ represents a stochastic shock to productivity, with its logarithm deviation denoted by $\varepsilon^a_t$. Production input includes the labor supply shock, $Z^h_t$, that is introduced in equation (C.1). Then, equations [E.13] and [E.14] in GS become

$$q_t = \alpha h_t + \alpha \varepsilon^h_t + \varepsilon^a_t, \quad (C.57)$
Each firm’s profit maximizing problem yields equation \[27\] in GS:
\[
\frac{p_{S,j,t}q_{S,j,t} - r_{N,t-j}q_{N,j,t}}{q_{S,j,t} - q_{N,j,t}} = X_{j,t}.
\] (C.59)

Equation \[E.15\] holds:
\[
(\chi - 1)X_{j,t} = \mu_S p_{S,j,t} - \mu_N r_{N,t-j} + (\mu_S - 1)\chi(q_{S,j,t} - q_{N,j,t}).
\] (C.60)

Substituting equations (C.34) and (C.35), we obtain
\[
q_{S,j,t} = \frac{\lambda(1 - v_S)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} l_t - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_S}{(\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S)}(\eta - \epsilon)(p_{S,j,t} - p_{B,t}) - \epsilon(p_{S,j,t} - p_t) + y_t
\]
\[
= \frac{\lambda(1 - v_S)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} l_t - \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}p_{S,j,t} + (\eta - \epsilon)\frac{(1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}p_{B,t} + \epsilon p_t + y_t,
\] (C.61)

\[
q_{N,j,t} = \frac{\lambda(1 - v_N)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} l_t - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}(\eta - \epsilon)(r_{N,t-j} - p_{B,t}) - \epsilon(r_{N,t-j} - p_t) + y_t
\]
\[
= \frac{\lambda(1 - v_N)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} l_t - \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}r_{N,t-j} + (\eta - \epsilon)\frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}p_{B,t} + \epsilon p_t + y_t.
\] (C.62)

\[
(\chi - 1)X_{j,t} = \mu_S \chi p_{S,j,t} - \mu_N r_{N,t-j} + (\mu_S - 1)\chi
\]
\[
\left\{ \left( \frac{\lambda(1 - v_S)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} - \frac{\lambda(1 - v_N)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \right) l_t \right. - \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}p_{S,j,t}
\]
\[
\left. + \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}r_{N,t-j} \right. + (\eta - \epsilon)\left. \left( \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} - \frac{1 - \lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \right) p_{B,t} \right\}.
\]
\[(\chi - 1)X_{j,t} = \left\{ \mu_S - (\mu_S - 1) \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} \right\} \chi p_{S,j,t} \]

\[- \left\{ \mu_N - (\mu_S - 1) \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \right\} r_{N,t+1} \]

\[+ (\eta - \epsilon) \left( \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \right) (\mu_S - 1) \chi p_{B,t} \]

\[+ \left( \frac{1 - v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} - \frac{1 - v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \right) (\mu_S - 1) \chi l_t. \quad (C.63) \]

Note that, under flexible prices, the optimal markup for the sales price is given by equation [17] in GS:

\[\mu(p; P_B) = \frac{L \epsilon + (1 - L)\eta v(p; P_B)}{L(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - L)(\eta - 1)v(p; P_B)}. \quad (C.64)\]

Its steady-state value is given by

\[
\mu_S = \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_S}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S}, \quad (C.65) \\
\mu_S - 1 = \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S}, \quad (C.66) 
\]

so the coefficient on \( p_{S,j,t} \) becomes

\[
\left\{ \mu_S - (\mu_S - 1) \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} \right\} \chi = \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_S}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S} \chi \left\{ \mu_S - \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S} \right\} \chi = 0.
\]

The coefficient on \( r_{N,t+1} \) similarly becomes

\[
\mu_N - (\mu_S - 1) \chi \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} = \mu_N - (\mu_N - 1) \chi \frac{\lambda \epsilon + (1 - \lambda)\eta v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} = 0.
\]
The coefficient on $p_{B,t}$ becomes

\[
(\eta - \epsilon) \left( \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S} - \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N} \right) (\mu_S - 1) \chi
\]

\[
= (\eta - \epsilon) \left( \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S} \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N} \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N} \chi \right)
\]

\[
= (\eta - \epsilon) \left( \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_S}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1) v_S} \chi - \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_N}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1) v_N} \chi \right)
\]

\[
= \mu_S \chi - (\mu_S - 1) \chi \epsilon - \mu_N + (\mu_N - 1) \epsilon
\]

\[
= \mu_S \chi - \mu_N
\]

\[
= \frac{\mu_N - 1}{\mu_S - 1} - \mu_N = \frac{\mu_S(\mu_N - 1) - \mu_N(\mu_S - 1)}{\mu_S - 1} = \frac{\mu_N - 1 - (\mu_S - 1)}{\mu_S - 1}
\]

\[
= \chi - 1.
\]
The coefficient on $l_t$ becomes

$$
\left(\frac{1 - v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} - \frac{1 - v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}\right) (\mu_S - 1) \chi \lambda
$$

$$
= \frac{1 - v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_S} \lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S \chi \lambda
$$

$$
- \frac{1 - v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S \chi \lambda
$$

$$
= \frac{1 - v_S}{\lambda(\epsilon - 1) + (1 - \lambda)(\eta - 1)v_S} \chi \lambda
$$

$$
\left\{\frac{\mu_S - \eta(\mu_S - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)\lambda} + \frac{\mu_S - \epsilon(\mu_S - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)}\right\} \lambda
$$

$$
+ \left\{\frac{\mu_N - \eta(\mu_N - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)\lambda} + \frac{\mu_N - \epsilon(\mu_N - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)}\right\} \lambda
$$

$$
= -\left\{\frac{\mu_S \chi - \eta(\mu_N - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)\lambda(1 - \lambda)} + \frac{\mu_S \chi - \epsilon(\mu_N - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)}\right\} \lambda
$$

$$
+ \left\{\frac{\mu_N - \eta(\mu_N - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)\lambda} + \frac{\mu_N - \epsilon(\mu_N - 1)}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)}\right\} \lambda
$$

$$
= -\frac{\mu_S \chi}{(\eta - \epsilon)\lambda(1 - \lambda)} \lambda + \frac{\mu_N}{(\eta - \epsilon)\lambda(1 - \lambda)} \lambda
$$

$$
= -\frac{\mu_S \chi - \mu_N}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} \lambda
$$

$$
= -\frac{\chi - 1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)}.
$$

Therefore, equation (C.63) is simplified as

$$(\chi - 1)X_{j,t} = (\chi - 1)p_{B,t} - \frac{\chi - 1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t,
$$

$$
X_{j,t} = p_{B,t} - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t.
$$

(C.67)

The right hand side of the equation is independent of $j$, so all firms have the same marginal cost.

Equation [27] in GS suggests

$$
p_{S,j,t} = \mu_{S,j,t} + X_{j,t}.
$$
Substitution of equations (C.33) and (C.40) yields
\[
p_{S,j,t} = -\varrho S v_{S,j,t} + \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \varrho S l_t + X_{j,t} \\
= \varrho S (\eta - \epsilon)(p_{S,j,t} - p_{B,t}) + \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \varrho S l_t + X_{j,t} \\
= \varrho S (\eta - \epsilon) p_{S,j,t} - \varrho S (\eta - \epsilon) \left\{ X_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1-\lambda)} l_t \right\} + \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \varrho S l_t + X_t,
\]
and equation [E.17] in GS holds:
\[
\{1 - \varrho S (\eta - \epsilon)\} (p_{S,j,t} - X_t) = \left\{ \frac{\varrho S}{1-\lambda} - \frac{\varrho S (\eta - \epsilon)}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1-\lambda)} \right\} l_t \\
= 0. \tag{C.68}
\]
We thus have
\[
p_{S,j,t} = X_t. \tag{C.69}
\]
Regarding normal prices, the log-linearization of the first-order condition, equation [26] in GS, becomes
\[
\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi_p)^j E_t [r_{N,j,t} - \mu_{N,j,t+j} - X_{t+j}] = 0, \tag{C.70}
\]
which corresponds to equation [E.18] in GS. From equations (C.33) and (C.41), the optimal markup \(\mu_{N,j,t+j}\) becomes
\[
\mu_{N,j,t} = -\varrho N v_{N,j,t} + \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \varrho N l_t \\
= \varrho N (\eta - \epsilon)(r_{N,t-j} - p_{B,t}) + \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \varrho N l_t.
\]
Equation (C.67) yields
\[
\mu_{N,j,t} = \varrho N (\eta - \epsilon) \left( r_{N,t-j} - X_{j,t} - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1-\lambda)} l_t \right) + \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \varrho N l_t \\
= \varrho N (\eta - \epsilon) (r_{N,t-j} - X_{j,t}).
\]
Equation (C.70) thus becomes

\[
\{1 - \varrho_N(\eta - \epsilon)\} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi_p)^j E_t [r_{N,t} - X_{t+j}] = 0,
\]

and equation [E.19] in GS is obtained:

\[
r_{N,t} = (1 - \beta \phi_p) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \phi_p)^j E_t X_{t+j}.
\] (C.71)

Equation (C.54) and \( p_{S;J,t} = X_t \) change equation [E.20] in GS as

\[
\varphi_{PP} = \theta_p p_{S,t} + (1 - \theta_p) p_{N,t} - p_t - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \omega}{\lambda - \frac{\omega}{1 - \lambda}} \right) l_t
\]

\[
= \theta_p (X_t - p_t) + (1 - \theta_p) (p_{N,t} - p_t) - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \omega}{\lambda - \frac{\omega}{1 - \lambda}} \right) l_t.
\] (C.72)

Equations (C.45), (C.67), and \( p_{S;J,t} = X_t \) change equation [E.21] in GS as

\[
\varphi_{BB} = \theta_B p_{S,t} + (1 - \theta_B) p_{N,t} - p_{B,t}
\]

\[
= \theta_B X_t + (1 - \theta_B) p_{N,t} - X_t - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t
\]

\[
= (1 - \theta_B) (p_{N,t} - X_t) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t.
\] (C.73)

Using equations (C.72) and (C.73), we obtain

\[
\left\{ \frac{(1 - \theta_B) (p_{N,t} - X_t) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t}{\varphi_P} \right\} / \varphi_B
\]

\[
= \left\{ \theta_p (X_t - p_t) + (1 - \theta_p) (p_{N,t} - p_t) - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \omega}{\lambda - \frac{\omega}{1 - \lambda}} \right) l_t \right\} / \varphi_P
\]

\[
= \left\{ \theta_p (X_t - p_t) + (1 - \theta_p) (p_{N,t} - X_t + X_t - p_t) - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \omega}{\lambda - \frac{\omega}{1 - \lambda}} \right) l_t \right\} / \varphi_P
\]

\[
\frac{X_t - p_t}{\varphi_P} = \left\{ \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} - \frac{1 - \theta_p}{\varphi_P} \right\} (p_{N,t} - X_t)
\]

\[
- \left\{ \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda) \varphi_B} - \frac{\lambda}{\varphi_P} \left( \frac{1 - \omega}{\lambda - \frac{\omega}{1 - \lambda}} \right) \right\} l_t
\]

63
\[ X_t - p_t = \left\{ \frac{(1 - \theta_B)\varphi_P - (1 - \theta_P)\varphi_B}{\varphi_B} \right\} (p_{N,t} - X_t) - A_1 t. \]

where
\[
A \equiv \frac{\varphi_P}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} - \lambda \left( \frac{1-\omega}{\epsilon - 1} \right). \tag{C.74}
\]

Equation [E.22] in GS becomes
\[
X_t - p_t = (1 - \psi)(X_t - p_{N,t}) - A_1 t, \tag{C.75}
\]

where equation [E.23] is defined as
\[
1 - \psi = -\frac{(1 - \theta_B)\varphi_P - (1 - \theta_P)\varphi_B}{\varphi_B},
\]
\[
\psi = 1 + \frac{(1 - \theta_B)\varphi_P - (1 - \theta_P)\varphi_B}{\varphi_B} = \frac{(1 - \theta_B)\varphi_P + \theta_P\varphi_B}{\varphi_B}. \tag{C.76}
\]

Equation (C.43) is rearranged as equation [E.24] in GS:
\[
p_{N,t} = \phi_p p_{N,t-1} + (1 - \phi_p)r_{N,t}, \tag{C.77}
\]

and equation (C.71) is rearranged as equation [E.25] in GS:
\[
r_{N,t} = \beta\phi_p E_t r_{N,t+1} + (1 - \beta\phi_p)X_t. \tag{C.78}
\]

Multiplying the above by \((1 - \phi_p)\) and substituting it to equation (C.77) yields
\[
p_{N,t} = \phi_p p_{N,t-1} + (1 - \phi_p)\beta\phi_p E_t r_{N,t+1} + (1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta\phi_p)X_t,
\]
\[
p_{N,t} - \phi_p p_{N,t-1} = (1 - \phi_p)\beta\phi_p E_t r_{N,t+1} + (1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta\phi_p)X_t
\]
\[
= \beta\phi_p \{ E_t p_{N,t+1} - \phi_p p_{N,t} \} + (1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta\phi_p)X_t.
\]

Defining \(\pi_{N,t} \equiv p_{N,t} - p_{N,t-1}\) and adding \((\phi_p - 1)p_{N,t}\) to both terms, we obtain equation
[E.26] in GS:

\begin{align*}
\phi_p (p_{N,t} - p_{N,t-1}) &= \beta \phi_p \{ E_t p_{N,t+1} - p_{N,t} + \phi_p p_{N,t} \} + (1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta \phi_p)X_t \\
&\quad + (\phi_p - 1)p_{N,t} \\
\phi_p \pi_{N,t} &= \beta \phi_p E_t \pi_{N,t+1} + (1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta \phi_p)X_t - (\phi_p - 1)(1 - \beta \phi_p) p_{N,t} \\
\phi_p \pi_{N,t} &= \beta \phi_p E_t \pi_{N,t+1} + (1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta \phi_p)(X_t - p_{N,t}) \\
\pi_{N,t} &= \beta E_t \pi_{N,t+1} + \frac{(1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta \phi_p)}{\phi_p} (X_t - p_{N,t}),
\end{align*}

where we define

\[ \kappa \equiv \frac{(1 - \phi_p)(1 - \beta \phi_p)}{\phi_p}. \] (C.80)

Taking the first difference of equation (C.73) yields an equivalent equation of [E.27] in GS:

\begin{align*}
\varphi_B s \Delta s_t &= (1 - \theta_B)(\Delta p_{N,t} - \Delta X_t) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} \Delta l_t, \\
s \Delta s_t &= -\frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} (\Delta X_t - \pi_{N,t}) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} \Delta l_t.
\end{align*}

The first difference of equation (C.54) becomes

\begin{align*}
\pi_t &= \theta_p (p_{S,t} - p_{S,t-1}) + (1 - \theta_p) \pi_{N,t} - \varphi p s \Delta s_t \\
&\quad - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \eta}{\lambda} - \frac{1 - \eta}{\epsilon - 1} \right) \Delta l_t.
\end{align*}
From $p_{S,j,t} = X_t$, it becomes

$$
\pi_t = \theta_p \Delta X_t + (1 - \theta_p) \pi_{N,t} - \varphi_p s \Delta s_t - \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \varphi}{\epsilon - 1} \right) \Delta l_t
$$

$$
= \pi_{N,t} + \theta_p (\Delta X_t - \pi_{N,t})
+ \varphi_p \left\{ \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} (\Delta X_t - \pi_{N,t}) \right\}
- \lambda \left( \frac{1 - \varphi}{\epsilon - 1} \right) \Delta l_t
= \pi_{N,t} + (1 - \theta_B) \varphi_p + \theta_p \varphi_B (\Delta X_t - \pi_{N,t}) + A \Delta l_t
= \pi_{N,t} + \psi (\Delta X_t - \pi_{N,t}) + A \Delta l_t.
$$

Defining $x_t \equiv X_t - p_t$, we transform equation (C.75):

$$
x_t = (1 - \psi) (x_t + p_t - p_{N,t}) - A l_t, \quad \text{(C.82)}
$$

$$
\Delta x_t = (1 - \psi) (\Delta x_t + \pi_t - \pi_{N,t}) - A \Delta l_t,
\pi_{N,t} = \pi_t - \psi \Delta x_t - \frac{A}{1 - \psi} \Delta l_t.
$$

Substituting this into equation (C.79) yields

$$
\pi_t - \frac{\psi}{1 - \psi} \Delta x_t - \frac{A}{1 - \psi} \Delta l_t
= \beta E_t \left\{ \pi_{t+1} - \frac{\psi}{1 - \psi} \Delta x_{t+1} - \frac{A}{1 - \psi} \Delta l_{t+1} \right\}
+ \frac{(1 - \phi_p) (1 - \beta \phi_p)}{\phi_p} (X_t - p_{N,t}).
$$

From equation (C.75), it becomes

$$
\pi_t - \frac{\psi}{1 - \psi} \Delta x_t - \frac{A}{1 - \psi} \Delta l_t
= \beta E_t \left\{ \pi_{t+1} - \frac{\psi}{1 - \psi} \Delta x_{t+1} - \frac{A}{1 - \psi} \Delta l_{t+1} \right\}
+ \frac{(1 - \phi_p) (1 - \beta \phi_p)}{\phi_p} \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \psi} x_t + \frac{A}{1 - \psi} l_t \right\},
$$

66
and equivalent equation to [32] in GS is obtained:

\[
\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 - \psi} \left\{ \kappa x_t + \psi (\Delta x_t - \beta E_t \Delta x_{t+1}) + \kappa A l_t + A (\Delta l_t - \beta E_t \Delta l_{t+1}) \right\} .
\]  
(C.83)

**Lemma 4 in GS** Using

\[
\mu_t = p_{S,t} - p_{N,t},
\]  
(C.84)
equation (C.75) suggests

\[
X_t - p_t = (1 - \psi)(X_t - p_{N,t}) - Al_t,
\]
\[
X_t - p_t = (1 - \psi)(p_{S,t} - p_{N,t}) - Al_t
\]
\[
x_t = (1 - \psi)\mu_t - Al_t,
\]
yielding an equivalent equation to [E.37] in GS:

\[
\mu_t = \frac{1}{1 - \psi} (x_t + Al_t).
\]  
(C.85)

From equations (C.31) to (C.33), we have

\[
q_{S,t} = \frac{\lambda (1 - v_S)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S} l_t + \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S} \{-(\eta - \epsilon)(p_{S,t} - p_{B,t})\} - \epsilon (p_{S,t} - p_t) + y_t,
\]
\[
q_{N,t} = \frac{\lambda (1 - v_N)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N} l_t + \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N} \{-(\eta - \epsilon)(p_{N,t} - p_{B,t})\} - \epsilon (p_{N,t} - p_t) + y_t.
\]

Using equation (C.67) and \(p_{S,t} = X_t\), we have

\[
q_{S,t} = \frac{\lambda (1 - v_S)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S} l_t + \frac{(1 - \lambda) v_S}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S} (\eta - \epsilon) \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t
\]
\[
= l_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t
\]  
(C.86)
\[ q_{N,t} = \frac{\lambda(1 - v_N)}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} l_t - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} (\eta - \epsilon) \left( p_{N,t} - p_{S,t} - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right) \]
\[ - \epsilon(p_{N,t} - p_t) + y_t \]
\[ = l_t - \frac{(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} (\eta - \epsilon) (p_{N,t} - p_{S,t}) - \epsilon(p_{N,t} - p_{S,t} + p_{S,t} - p_t) + y_t \]
\[ = l_t - \frac{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)v_N + \epsilon\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} (p_{N,t} - p_{S,t}) - \epsilon(X_t - p_t) + y_t \]
\[ = l_t + \frac{\epsilon\lambda + \eta(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N} \mu_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t. \quad (C.87) \]

Then, the quantity ratio becomes

\[ \chi_t = q_{S,t} - q_{N,t} \]
\[ = -\zeta_N \mu_t, \quad (C.88) \]

where

\[ \zeta_N = \frac{\epsilon\lambda + \eta(1 - \lambda)v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)v_N}. \quad (C.89) \]

From equation (C.85), the quantity ratio becomes

\[ \chi_t = -\frac{\zeta_N}{1 - \psi} (x_t + A_l_t). \quad (C.90) \]

Equation (C.73) is transformed into an equivalent equation to [E.39] in GS:

\[ s_{S,t} = \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} (p_{N,t} - X_t) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} l_t \]
\[ = \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} (p_{N,t} - p_{S,t}) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} l_t \]
\[ = -\frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} (x_t + A_l_t) - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} l_t \]
\[ = -\frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} x_t - \left( \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{A}{1 - \psi} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} \right) l_t. \quad (C.91) \]

Let

\[ \Delta_t \equiv y_t - q_t. \quad (C.92) \]

Using equation (C.42), total output becomes

\[ q_t = \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} s_{S,t} + \frac{s\chi}{s\chi + 1 - s} q_{S,t} + \frac{(1 - s)}{s\chi + 1 - s} q_{N,t}. \]
Equations (C.86) and (C.87) yield

\[
q_t = \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} ss_t + \frac{s\lambda}{s\chi + 1 - s} (l_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t) \\
+ \frac{(1 - s)}{s\chi + 1 - s} \left\{ l_t + \frac{\epsilon \lambda + \eta(1 - \lambda) v_N}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N} \mu_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t \right\} \\
= \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} ss_t + l_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t \\
+ \frac{1 - s}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{s_N}{1 - \psi} (x_t + A_l_t).
\]

From equation (C.91), it becomes

\[
q_t = \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \left\{ -\frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} x_t - \left( \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{A}{1 - \psi} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} \right) l_t \right\} \\
+ l_t - \epsilon x_t + y_t + \frac{1 - s}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{s_N}{1 - \psi} (x_t + A_l_t) \\
= y_t - \delta x_t - Bl_t,
\]

where equation [E.40] in GS becomes

\[
\delta \equiv \epsilon + \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} \frac{1 - s}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{s_N}{1 - \psi} \\
= \epsilon + \frac{1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} \left( \frac{(\chi - 1)(1 - \theta_B)}{\varphi_B} - (1 - s)\xi_N \right), \tag{C.93}
\]

\[
B \equiv -1 + \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \left( \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{A}{1 - \psi} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} \right) \\
- \frac{1 - s}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{s_N}{1 - \psi} A \\
= -1 + \frac{1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} \left( \frac{(\chi - 1)(1 - \theta_B)}{\varphi_B} - (1 - s)\xi_N \right) A \\
+ \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B} \\
= -1 + (\delta - \epsilon) A + \frac{\chi - 1}{s\chi + 1 - s} \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)\varphi_B}. \tag{C.94}
\]
Thus, we have

\[
\Delta_t \equiv y_t - q_t \\
= \delta x_t + Bl_t. \tag{C.95}
\]

From equation (C.58), the real marginal cost becomes

\[
x_t = \gamma q_t + w_t \\
= \gamma (y_t - \Delta_t) + w_t \\
= \gamma (y_t - \delta x_t - Bl_t) + w_t, \tag{C.96}
\]

and then equation [A.9b] in GS becomes

\[
x_t = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} w_t + \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma \delta} (y_t - Bl_t). \tag{C.97}
\]

Quantity becomes

\[
q_t = y_t - \Delta_t \\
= y_t - \delta x_t - Bl_t \\
= y_t - \delta \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} w_t + \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma \delta} (y_t - Bl_t) \right) - Bl_t \\
= \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} y_t - \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} w_t - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} Bl_t. \tag{C.98}
\]

**Log-linearization of households’ part**  From equations (C.12) and (C.13), the consumption wedge \( F_t \) becomes

\[
f_t = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{\lambda P_{SN}(l_t + p_{SN,t}) - \lambda l_t}{\lambda P_{SN} + (1 - \lambda)} \\
= \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{P_{SN} p_{SN,t} - (1 - P_{SN}) l_t}{\lambda P_{SN} + (1 - \lambda)}, \tag{C.99}
\]
where

\[
PSN_t = \frac{\mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta}(s_t + \epsilon \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \mu_t) - ss_t}{s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} + (1 - s)} - \frac{\epsilon s \mu^{1-\eta}(s_t + (1 - \eta)\mu_t) - ss_t}{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)}
\]

\[
= \frac{s(\mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} - 1)s_t + s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \epsilon \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \mu_t - \epsilon s(\mu^{1-\eta} - 1)s_t + s \mu^{1-\eta}(1 - \eta)\mu_t}{s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} + (1 - s)}
\]

\[
= \left(\mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} - 1\right) \frac{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)}{s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} + (1 - s)} - \frac{\epsilon \frac{1-\eta}{\eta}(\mu^{1-\eta} - 1)}{s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} + (1 - s)} \left\{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)\right\}
\]

\[
+ \frac{\mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \epsilon \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \left\{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)\right\} - \frac{\epsilon \frac{1-\eta}{\eta}(1 - \eta)}{s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} + (1 - s)} \left\{s \mu^{1-\eta} + (1 - s)\right\}}{s \mu \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} + (1 - s)} s \mu_t
\] (C.100)

Using equation (C.26), we transform equation (C.20) into

\[
0 = \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C} \cdot C(E_t c_{t+1} - c_t) - (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + E_t(f_{t+1} - f_t) - \epsilon E_t \left[(p_{B,t+1} - p_{t+1}) - (p_{B,t} - p_t)\right]
\]

\[
= -\theta^{-1}_c \left\{E_t(y_{t+1} - \epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C}) + f_{t+1} - \epsilon (p_{B,t+1} - p_{t+1})\right\} - (y_t - \epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C} + f_t - \epsilon (p_{B,t} - p_t))
\]

\[- (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + E_t(f_{t+1} - f_t) - \epsilon E_t \left[(p_{B,t+1} - p_{t+1}) - (p_{B,t} - p_t)\right],
\]

where \(\epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C}\) represents a stochastic government shock. From equation (C.67), it becomes

\[
0 = \theta^{-1}_c \left\{E_t(y_{t+1} - \epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C} + f_{t+1} - \epsilon \left[x_{t+1} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_{t+1}\right]\right\}
\]

\[- (y_t - \epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C} + f_t - \epsilon \left[x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t\right])
\]

\[- (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) - E_t(f_{t+1} - f_t)
\]

\[+ \epsilon E_t \left[x_{t+1} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_{t+1} - x_t - \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t\right],
\]

\[
y_t = E_t y_{t+1} - \theta_c (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + \epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C} - \epsilon \frac{\nu_{CC}}{\nu_C}
\]

\[+ (1 - \theta_c) \left\{\Delta f_{t+1} - \epsilon \left(\Delta x_{t+1} + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} \Delta l_{t+1}\right)\right\}.
\] (C.101)
Equation (C.21) becomes

\[
\frac{v_{HH}}{v_H} \left\{ H h_t - \theta_L \phi_L \frac{(1 - \lambda)^{\theta_L - 1}}{(1 - \lambda) \theta_L} \lambda t \right\} + \frac{\varepsilon^h_t}{v_{CC}} Cc_t = w_t + f_t - \epsilon (p_{B,t} - p_t), \tag{C.102}
\]

where \( \varepsilon^h_t \) represents a stochastic shock to labor supply. The first term on the right-hand side of the equation implies that \( h_t \) are positively correlated with \( l_t \) if all other things equal. A decline in hours worked involves a decrease in loyal customers. From equations (C.26) and (C.67), this equation becomes

\[
\theta_h^{-1} \left( h_t - \theta_L \phi_L (1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{H} l_t \right) + \varepsilon^h_t
\]

\[
\quad + \theta^e \left( y_t - \varepsilon^a_t + f_t - \epsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right] \right)
\]

\[
= w_t + f_t - \epsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right]. \tag{C.103}
\]

From equations (C.57) and (C.98), hours worked are given by

\[
h_t = \frac{q_t - \varepsilon^a_t}{\alpha} - \varepsilon^h_t
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} y_t - \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} w_t - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} Bl_t - \varepsilon^a_t - \varepsilon^h_t
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} y_t - \delta w_t - Bl_t - \frac{1}{\alpha} \varepsilon^a_t - \varepsilon^h_t. \tag{C.104}
\]

Shifting \( \varepsilon^h_t \) to the left-hand side yields production input:

\[
\varepsilon^h_t + h_t = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} y_t - \delta w_t - Bl_t - \frac{1}{\alpha} \varepsilon^a_t. \tag{C.105}
\]
Substituting equation (C.104) yields

\[
\theta_h^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{y_t - \delta w_t - Bl_t}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^a - \varepsilon_t^h \right) + \varepsilon_t^h \\
- \theta_h^{-1} \theta_L \phi_L (1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{H} l_t \\
+ \theta_c^{-1} (y_t - \varepsilon_t^o + f_t - \varepsilon) \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \varepsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right]
\]

\[
= w_t + f_t - \varepsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \varepsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right],
\]

\[
0 = \left( \theta_c^{-1} + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) y_t - \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) w_t \\
- \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^o - (\theta_h^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_t^h - \theta_c^{-1} \varepsilon_t^o \\
- \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} B + \theta_h^{-1} \theta_L \phi_L (1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{H} \right) l_t \\
- (1 - \theta_c^{-1}) \left\{ f_t - \varepsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \varepsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right] \right\}.
\]

(C.106)

In the presence of wage stickiness, the right-hand side of the equation deviates from zero:

\[
\pi_{W,t} = \beta \pi_{W,t+1} \\
+ \frac{(1 - \phi_w)(1 - \beta \phi_w)}{\phi_w} \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon \theta_h^{-1}} \left[ \left( \theta_c^{-1} + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) y_t - \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) w_t \\
- \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^o - (\theta_h^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_t^h - \theta_c^{-1} \varepsilon_t^o \\
- \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} B + \theta_h^{-1} \theta_L \phi_L (1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{H} \right) l_t \\
- (1 - \theta_c^{-1}) \left\{ f_t - \varepsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \varepsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right] \right\} \right].
\]

(C.107)
Equation (C.23) becomes

\[
- (\theta_L - 1) \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} l_t \\
+ \frac{v_{HH}}{v_H} (Hh_t - \theta_L \phi_L(1 - \lambda)^{-1} \lambda l_t) - \frac{v_{CC}}{v_c} Cc_t + \varepsilon_t^h \\
= c_t - \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} - \frac{\lambda P_{SN}(l_t + p_{SN,t}) - \lambda l_t}{\lambda P_{SN} + (1 - \lambda)},
\]

\[
- (\theta_L - 1) \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} l_t \\
+ \theta_h^{-1} h_t - \theta_h^{-1} \phi_L(1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{H} l_t + \theta_c^{-1} c_t + \varepsilon_t^h \\
= c_t - \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} - \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} f_t,
\]

\[
- (\theta_L - 1) \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} l_t \\
+ \theta_h^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{y_t - \delta w_t - B l_t}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{\alpha} \varepsilon_i^a - \varepsilon_i^h \right) + \varepsilon_t^h \\
- \theta_h^{-1} \phi_L(1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{H} l_t \\
+ (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \left( y_t - \varepsilon_i^g + f_t - \epsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right] \right) \\
= - \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} - \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} f_t.
\]

\[
0 = \left( \theta_c^{-1} - 1 + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \right) y_t - \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} w_t \\
- \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_i^a - (\theta_h^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_i^h - (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \varepsilon_i^g \\
- \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} B + (\theta_L - 1) \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} + \theta_h^{-1} \phi_L \frac{\lambda}{(1 - \lambda)H} \right) l_t \\
+ (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \left\{ f_t - \epsilon \left[ x_t + \frac{1}{(\eta - \epsilon)(1 - \lambda)} l_t \right] \right\} \\
+ \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} + \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} f_t.
\]
**Steady state conditions**

To calibrate parameters associated with the fraction of loyal customers $\phi_L$ and $\theta_L$, we consider steady state conditions.

From equations (C.21) and (C.23),

$$
\frac{v_H(H_t + \phi_L(1-L_t)^{\eta_L})}{v_C(C_t)} = \frac{W_t F_t \left( \frac{P_{B,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon}}{\eta - 1} \frac{1 - P_{SN,t}}{L_t P_{SN,t} + (1 - L_t)};
$$

we obtain the following steady state condition:

$$
\theta_L \phi_L (1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{v_H(H_t + \phi_L(1-L_t)^{\eta_L})}{v_C(C_t)} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{1 - P_{SN}}{\lambda P_{SN} + (1 - \lambda)}.
$$

Substituting equation (C.25)

$$
Y = C \frac{F}{\lambda (\frac{P_B}{P})^{-\epsilon}},
$$

it becomes

$$
\theta_L \phi_L (1 - \lambda)^{-1} \frac{W}{\lambda F} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{1 - P_{SN}}{\lambda P_{SN} + (1 - \lambda)}.
$$

As for the right-hand side of the equation, $P_{SN}$ is given by equation (C.13):

$$
P_{SN} \equiv \frac{s \mu^{1-n}}{(s \mu^{1-n} + (1 - s))^{1/\eta}},
$$

As for the left-side of the equation, we calculate $W/PY$. Firms’ optimal normal price satisfies

$$
\frac{P_N}{P} = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{X}{P},
$$
from equation [26] in GS. The nominal marginal cost $X$ is given by

$$X = \frac{\partial(Q(H)^{-1})}{\partial Q} = WH \frac{\alpha Q}{\alpha Q},$$

where $\alpha$ represents the elasticity of output with respect to hours worked. Therefore, we have

$$\frac{W}{PY} = \frac{W Q}{PQY} = \frac{P_N \epsilon - 1}{\epsilon H Y}.$$ (C.111)

Here, from the definition of price index, we have

$$\frac{P_N}{P} = \frac{P_N}{P_L} \left\{ \frac{\lambda P_L^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - \lambda) P_B^{1-\epsilon}}{P_L^{1-\epsilon}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

$$= \frac{P_N}{P_L} \left\{ \frac{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \tilde{h}^{1-\epsilon}}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \tilde{h}^{1-\epsilon}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \left\{ \frac{P_N}{P_L} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

$$= \frac{P_N}{P_L} \left\{ \frac{1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \tilde{h}^{1-\epsilon}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \left\{ \frac{1}{\mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}.$$ (C.112)

The relationship between $Q$ and $Y$ is given by

$$Q = sQ_S + (1 - s)Q_N$$
$$= s(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S) \left( \frac{P_S}{P} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} Y$$
$$+ (1 - s)(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N) \left( \frac{P_N}{P} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} Y,$$

where

$$v_S = \left( \frac{P_S}{P_B} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)} = \left( \frac{P_S}{P_B} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)}$$
$$= \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{h}} \frac{\mu}{\tilde{h} P_L} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)}$$

$$= \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{h}} \frac{\mu}{\tilde{h} \{s \mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s \}^{1-\epsilon}} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)}.$$
\[ v_N = \left( \frac{P_N}{P_B} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)} = \left( \frac{P_N}{\frac{h}{\mu} P_L} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)} \]
\[ = \left( \frac{1}{\frac{h}{\mu} \{ s \mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \right)^{-(\eta - \epsilon)}. \]

Therefore, we obtain
\[ \frac{Q}{Y} = s(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_S) \left( \frac{P_S}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} \]
\[ \quad + (1 - s)(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) v_N) \left( \frac{P_N}{P} \right)^{-\epsilon} \]
\[ = s \left\{ \lambda + (1 - \lambda) \left( \frac{1}{\frac{h}{\mu} \{ s \mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \right) \right\}^{-(\eta - \epsilon)} \]
\[ \cdot \left\{ \frac{1}{\{ \lambda + (1 - \lambda) \mu^{1-\epsilon} \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \frac{\mu}{\{ s \mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \right\}^{-\epsilon} \]
\[ + (1 - s) \left\{ \lambda + (1 - \lambda) \left( \frac{1}{\frac{h}{\mu} \{ s \mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \right) \right\}^{-(\eta - \epsilon)} \]
\[ \cdot \left\{ \frac{1}{\{ \lambda + (1 - \lambda) \mu^{1-\epsilon} \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \frac{1}{\{ s \mu^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - s \}^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}}} \right\}^{-\epsilon}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (C.113)

Equation (C.109) with equations (C.110), (C.111), (C.112), and (C.113) give the condition for the parameters \( \phi_L \) and \( \theta_L \).

**A case where firms do not observe** \( l_t \)  Equation (C.67) becomes independent of \( l_t \) :
\[ X_{j,t} = p_{B,t} \]  \hspace{1cm} (C.114)

Equation (C.73) becomes
\[ \varphi_{BS,t} = (1 - \theta_B)(P_{N,t} - X_t), \]  \hspace{1cm} (C.115)
which is the same as equation [E.21] in GS. Equation (C.74) becomes

\[
A \equiv -\lambda \left( \frac{1-\omega}{\lambda} - \frac{\omega}{1-\lambda} \right).
\]  

(C.116)

Equation (C.91) becomes

\[
ss_t = \frac{1 - \theta_B}{\varphi_B} \frac{1}{1 - \psi} (x_t + Al_t).
\]  

(C.117)

Equation (C.94) becomes

\[
B \equiv -1 + (\delta - \epsilon)A.
\]  

(C.118)

Equation (C.101) becomes

\[
y_t = E_t y_{t+1} - \theta_c (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + (1 - \theta_c) \{ \Delta f_{t+1} - \epsilon \Delta x_{t+1} \}.
\]  

(C.119)

Equation (C.107) becomes

\[
\pi_{W,t} = \beta \pi_{W,t+1} + \frac{(1 - \phi_w)(1 - \beta \phi_w)}{\phi_w} \frac{1}{1 + \xi h^{-1}} \left[ \left( \theta_c^{-1} + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta \alpha} \theta_h^{-1} \right) y_t - \left( 1 + \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta \alpha} \theta_h^{-1} \right) w_t - \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^a + \varepsilon_t^h + \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta \alpha} B - \theta_h^{-1} \phi \lambda \right) l_t - (1 - \theta_c^{-1}) \{ f_t - \epsilon x_t \} \right].
\]  

(C.120)
Equation (C.108) becomes

\[
0 = \left( \theta_c^{-1} - 1 + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \theta_h^{-1} \right) y_t - \frac{\delta}{1 + \gamma \delta} \theta_h^{-1} w_t
- \frac{\theta_h^{-1}}{\alpha} \varepsilon_t^a + \varepsilon_t^h
+ \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \delta} \theta_h^{-1} B - \theta_h^{-1} \phi \frac{\lambda}{H} \right) l_t
+ (\theta_c^{-1} - 1) \{ f_t - \epsilon x_t \}
+ \frac{P_{SN}}{1 - P_{SN}} p_{SN,t} + \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} f_t.
\]