On Constructing Strategy-Proof and Democratic Social Choice Correspon-
dences : Possibility and Impossibility Results

Shin Sato *
Graduate School of Economics, Keio University
E-mail: sato@gs.econ.keio.ac.jp

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Abstract

We investigate the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and democratic social choice correspon-
dences. Two different definitions of strategy-proofness are presented. Based on the first definition, we
show that there is no democratic and strategy-proof social choice correspondence. On the other hand, the
second definition leads to both possibility and impossibility results; the possibility result states that there
is a strategy-proof and democratic social choice correspondence; on the other hand, the impossibility re-
result states that such a social choice correspondence cannot be selective, as conjectured by Gärdenfors
[1].

References

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